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1. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–29 (1998) (analyzing the
various interpretations of the phrase “carries a firearm”); id. at 144 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
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But, between a court and an agency, which entity should be chiefly responsible
for statutory interpretation? In the landmark Chevron decision, the Supreme
Court crafted a two-step inquiry for a court’s review of an agency’s statutory
interpretation.2 The first step considers whether congressional intent is clear
and, if it is, the agency and the court must interpret the statute consistent with
the intent of Congress.3 If the statute is ambiguous, however, the second step
requires the court to defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the
statute.4 The court must defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the
statute even if the court would have interpreted the ambiguity differently.5
Although Chevron was groundbreaking in numerous fields, it merely reflected
the existent standard operating procedure in the field of securities regulation.
Before Chevron, courts routinely deferred to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”)—the agency Congress charged with
administering federal securities laws.6 In particular, before Chevron, courts
accorded great weight to the SEC’s interpretation of whether a financial

(“And in the television series M*A*S*H, Hawkeye Pierce (played by Alan Alda) presciently
proclaims: ‘I will not carry a gun . . . . I’ll carry your books, I’ll carry a torch, I’ll carry a tune,
I’ll carry on, carry over, carry forward, Cary Grant, cash and carry, carry me back to Old
Virginia, I’ll even ‘hari-kari’ if you show me how, but I will not carry a gun!’” (citation
omitted)). Additionally, Congress may intentionally enact ambiguous statutes. See Joseph A.
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640 (2002) (suggesting
that Congress might rationally choose to use ambiguous terms if intending to allow the courts to
resolve disputes with flexible rather than stringent standards).
2. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
3. Id. at 842–43.
4. Id. at 843.
5. See id. at 843 n.11 (noting that a court should not apply its own interpretation of a
statute, but must defer to an agency interpretation where it is reasonable).
6. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (“[The SEC’s] interpretation
of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal adjudication, is entitled to deference if
it is reasonable . . . .” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 & n.12 (2001)));
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (“[Section] 14(e)’s rulemaking authorization
gives the Commission ‘latitude,’ even in the context of a term of art . . . [W]e owe the
Commission’s judgment ‘more than mere deference or weight.’ . . . [W]e must accord the
Commission’s assessment ‘controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.’” (second bracketing in original) (citations omitted)). For examples of
the powers that Congress delegated to the Commission, see infra Part II.A–B.
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instrument constituted a “security,” 7 a term that Congress defined
ambiguously.8
Since Chevron, the Supreme Court has decided four definition-of-security
cases.9 However, the Court referenced neither Chevron nor an alternative
deferential standard in any of those cases.10 Additionally, none of the four
cases discussed the appropriateness of deference to the Commission.
The Court’s failure to accord explicit deference to the SEC in
definition-of-security cases does not mean that it ultimately rejects the
Commission’s position;11 rather, the SEC’s interpretations generally fare well
7. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979)
(acknowledging that, although an agency’s interpretation is not controlling, “[i]t is a
commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative agency’s consistent, longstanding
interpretation of the statute under which it operates is entitled to considerable weight” (citing
United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S.
65, 74 (1974); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S.
1, 16 (1965))).
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (defining the term by setting forth more than twenty
instruments and including a circular definition: “The term ‘security’ means any . . . instrument
commonly known as a ‘security’”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) (same); SEC v.
Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (“Congress . . . enacted a broad definition of ‘security,’
sufficient to ‘encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment.’” (quoting
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990))); infra Part II.D.
9. See Edwards, 540 U.S. at 393; see also Reves, 494 U.S. at 61; Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985).
10. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (“Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that
an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the ‘specialized
experience and broader investigations and information’ available to the agency, and given the
value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law
requires.” (citations omitted) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944))).
11. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 33, Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (No. 02-1196), 2003 WL
21498455, at *15–16 & n.11 (seeking deference and referencing Chevron and Mead); Brief for
SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967)
(No. 104), 1967 WL 113740, at *9 (seeking deference based upon “the Commission’s settled
administrative interpretation” and its “repeated[] . . . determination[s] that such [instruments] are
covered by the Act”); Brief for Petitioner at 37, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)
(No. 843), 1946 WL 50582 at *37 (seeking deference and citing Skidmore). For examples of the
Commission seeking deference outside of the definition-of-security setting, see Brief for
Petitioner at 37–38, SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) (No. 01-147), 2001 WL 1663770, at
*34–39 (seeking deference and citing Chevron and Mead); and Brief for Petitioner at 36, United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842), 1997 WL 86306, at *36 (seeking
deference and citing Chevron).
Although the Court’s recent silence regarding deference to the Commission differs from its
pre-Chevron jurisprudence, the silence may be consistent with the Court’s recent unwillingness to
apply Chevron to Chevron-eligible cases. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 3.6 (4th ed. 2002) (“The Supreme Court has not shown comparable consistency and
conscientiousness in applying Chevron. . . . Sometimes it gives Chevron powerful effect,
sometimes it ignores Chevron, and sometimes it characterizes the Chevron test in strange and
inconsistent ways.”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (“[W]e found that the Court usually does not apply
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before the Court.12 Recently, without explanation, the Court has seemingly
deviated from its precedent favoring deference to the SEC’s interpretation of
statutory ambiguity.13
Some scholars have addressed the issue of court deference to an agency
regarding the agency’s own jurisdiction, but in so doing, these scholars have
made generalized arguments applicable to all agencies, typically failing to
closely examine any single agency. 14 This failure is significant because
Congress empowered each agency differently and statutory evidence of the
powers delegated to a particular agency informs the analysis of whether
Congress granted that particular agency the authority to speak to its own
jurisdiction.15 This Article takes a step towards filling this void, addressing
an issue that has divided justices, courts, and scholars. 16 The issue of
deference to the SEC demands consideration as financial players innovate new
financial products because the federal regulation of these products may hinge
on the Commission’s determination of whether any such product constitutes a
“security.”
Chevron to cases that are, according to Mead and other opinions, Chevron-eligible.”); infra Part
I.A.
12. See Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission: The
Lawyer as Prosecutor, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39 (1998) (“From its formation in 1934
until the mid-1970s, the SEC had a stellar record in the Supreme Court and the circuit courts,
especially the Second Circuit, not only in cases where the SEC or the United States was the
plaintiff, but also in cases where the SEC participated as amicus curiae.”).
13. See infra Part III.A–B. Although this Article suggests the propriety of deference to the
Commission regarding the definition of “security,” it does not address the degree of deference
owed to the SEC, which may vary depending on circumstances. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 228
(“The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to
vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its
consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s
position.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1158.
14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L REV. 2637, 2673–74
(2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 236 (2006).
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1130–32 (discussing the Court’s application of
various deferential regimes to an agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction). Compare
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating, “the rule of deference applies even to an agency’s interpretation of its own
statutory authority or jurisdiction” (citations omitted)); and Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v.
FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We afford Chevron deference to the Commission’s
assertion of jurisdiction.”), and Sunstein, supra note 14, at 236 (“In the end, there is no sufficient
basis for an exception to Chevron when jurisdictional issues are involved.”), with Miss. Power &
Light Co., 487 U.S. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[A]gencies can claim no special expertise in
interpreting a statute confining its jurisdiction.”), and NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 199 (2d
Cir. 2004) (arguing that it is unlikely Congress would allow an agency the authority to decide the
bounds of its own jurisdiction), and ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1567 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
and Garrett, supra note 14, at 2673–74 (asserting that “an independent judicial analysis to
determine the scope of the delegation is vital to ensure that a relatively impartial entity determines
the boundaries of agency authority”).
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Part I of this Article discusses potential impediments to Chevron’s
applicability to definition-of-security cases, contemplating the definition of
“security” as a jurisdictional issue and discussing the applicability of Chevron
to an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction. Part I then references
Chevron’s emphasis on the political accountability of an executive agency and
then examines the political accountability of the SEC, which is an independent
commission. Part I also addresses the applicability of a deferential regime to
agency interpretations when private parties seek to enforce the federal
securities laws. Looking beyond the Commission’s general rule-making
authority and its adjudicatory power, Part II examines evidence of
congressional delegation of interpretive authority to the Commission regarding
the definition of “security.” Part II also discusses the SEC’s power to exempt
“securities” from the reach of the federal securities laws, which amounts to the
power to determine whether or not the federal securities laws should apply to a
particular instrument. Part III examines two recent definition-of-security
cases in which the Supreme Court failed to defer to positions advanced by the
Commission, and the negative consequences of the Court’s decisions.
Finally, Part IV concludes that courts should defer to the Commission
regarding its reasonable interpretations of “security.”
I. IMPEDIMENTS TO CHEVRON’S APPLICABILITY
In the post-Chevron decision, SEC v. Edwards, the Court upheld
unanimously the position of the SEC, based on decades of formal
adjudications, that the disputed instrument constituted a “security.” 17 In
doing so, however, the Court did not reference the landmark Chevron decision.
Richard Pierce, a scholar of administrative law, termed this omission “curious”
and “strange.”18 Although Chevron deference may have been appropriate in
Edwards, a court need not always apply Chevron deference to the SEC’s
position regarding the definition of “security.” Other cases may require a
lesser degree of deference.19
A.

Chevron’s Applicability to an Agency’s Determination of Its Jurisdiction

When the Chevron Court introduced its method of judicial inquiry for
analyzing an agency’s interpretation of statutory ambiguity, it discussed the
appropriateness of deference to an agency entrusted by Congress to administer
17. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 396 (2004) (citing decisions from 1939 to 1982).
18. PIERCE, supra note 11, § 3.6, at 175.
19. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (noting that measure of
deference varies with the circumstances); see also, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222
(2002) (applying Chevron deference because of “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the
related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the
question over a long period of time”); Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231 (noting that Chevron
deference may be appropriate even absent administrative formality).
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the statute.20 The classic agency domain is interstitial matters.21 According
to the Court, the resolution of interstitial matters, which may require relevant
expertise and likely involves policy choice, is better suited to a politically
accountable expert (an agency) than a politically insulated non-expert (a
court).22
Scholars have noted that, in opinions following Chevron, where the facts
suggested the appropriateness for Chevron’s application, the Court, without
explanation, analyzed the issue without employing Chevron methodology.23
The Court has yet to address specifically the applicability of Chevron to an
agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction.24 Based on what the Court has
said and left unsaid, some scholars have concluded that the Court first
20. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“Sometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In
such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” (citing INS v. Jong Ha Wang,
450 U.S. 138, 144 (1981); Train v. NRDC, 299 U.S. 232, 235–37 (1936))).
21. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (“The power of an administrative agency
to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires . . . the making
of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”). In Chevron, the interstitial
matters concerned the definition of “stationary source.” See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i) (1983)).
22. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (arguing that “[j]udges are not experts in the field”); id. at
844 (“[T]he principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently
followed by this Court whenever decision as to the . . . reach of a statute has involved reconciling
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
23. See PIERCE, supra note 11, § 3.6, at 175 (noting that “sometimes [the Supreme Court]
ignores Chevron”); see also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1090 (“[W]e found that the Court
usually does not apply Chevron to cases that are, according to Mead and other opinions,
Chevron-eligible.”); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 239 (criticizing the Court’s after-the-fact
reference to Chevron: “[a]fter parsing the statute independently, the Court turned to Chevron in a
brief paragraph, noting (finally!)”).
24. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 2674; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 851 (2001). In particular, the Court has not cited
Chevron, or Mead or Skidmore, in any of its recent decisions regarding the definition of
“security,” which definition, in part, defines the Commission’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., SEC v.
Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990); Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985). Only
Edwards has hinted—without citation to Chevron, Mead, or Skidmore—at the Court’s possible
deference to the Commission’s position. See 540 U.S. at 396 (“[I]t is no surprise that the SEC
has consistently taken the opposite position [of that advocated by the petitioner] . . . . It has done
so in formal adjudications . . . and in enforcement actions . . . .”). However, even then, the Court
never used the term “deference” or any variation thereof and the hint followed the Court’s
independent analysis.
The Court has been invited to address an action by the Federal Communications Commission
that might be considered jurisdictional, and it may resolve the issue during the 2012 Term. See
City of Arlington, TX v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 524
(2012).
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determines whether Chevron even applies to the issue to be resolved—the
so-called Chevron Step Zero. 25 Some argue that Chevron’s Step Zero
analysis is appropriate when an agency’s jurisdiction is at issue.26
There are several reasons why a court’s interpretation of an agency’s
jurisdiction may be preferable to the agency’s determination of the same
issue. 27 When one turns from the resolution of an interstitial statutory
ambiguity, for which Congress intended the administering agency to be
interpreter-in-chief, to the resolution of an ambiguity regarding an agency’s
jurisdiction, some contend that courts should not defer to the administering
agency.28 Congress, it is argued, delegated to the agency the authority to
interpret matters within its jurisdiction, but Congress did not, the argument

25. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 24, at 873 (describing Step Zero as “the inquiry that
courts should undertake before moving on to [S]tep [O]ne”). Recall that Chevron introduced an
analysis involving Steps One and Two: (1) Is the statute ambiguous? (2) If so, did the agency
reasonably interpret the ambiguity? See supra text accompanying note 2.
26. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 24, at 912; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 234.
27. Although the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) arguably favors a court over an
agency as the primary interpreter of an agency’s jurisdiction, others have found that the statute
provides little resistance to court deference to the agency. Congress emphasized jurisdictional
limitations on agencies and also provided for court review under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. §
558(b) (2006) (“A [substantive rule or order] may not be . . . issued except within jurisdiction
delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“To the
extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law . . . .”); id. § 706(2)(C) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right . . . .”); 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b)(4) (2006) (stating
that a court shall enforce a rule unless it is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction [or] authority”).
Chevron itself contained no reference to these provisions nor did those justices who engaged in
debate on this particular issue make any reference to them. Compare Miss. Power & Light Co.
v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380–82 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (favoring
deference to agency), with id. at 386–89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (refusing to defer to the
agency). Moreover, “[i]n many statutes, Congress has not only enacted binding law, but has,
consistent with the APA, delegated to agencies the authority to create binding ‘law,’ usually
through formal adjudications and legislative rules.” Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1161
(citing Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 249–57 (1955));
see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113,
199–200 (1998) (“The [EPA’s] rulemaking power reconciles the result in Chevron with the
APA . . . . And the result can be extended to . . . administrative agencies [with]
. . . blanket authorizations to promulgate rules . . . .”). Congress also empowered the SEC with
broad rulemaking authority. See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2006) (“The Commission shall have
authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter . . . .”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1)
(2006) (“The Commission . . . shall . . . have power to make such rules and regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter for which [it is] responsible
or for the execution of the functions vested in [it] by this chapter . . . .”); Duffy, supra, at 202
(noting that a court may “find that the statute confers on the agency a lawmaking power”).
28. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 2674 (advising against Chevron deference for agency
jurisdictional questions).
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continues, delegate authority to the agency to interpret its own jurisdiction.29
Rather, jurisdictional matters involve issues familiar to courts, and a court’s
generalized legal expertise is sufficient.30
The agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction might be viewed with
skepticism. Perhaps for reasons of hubris or self-aggrandizement, an agency
may seek to expand its regulatory empire, an attempt that should not benefit
from a reviewing court’s deference.31 Some evidence suggests that the SEC
has attempted to expand its regulatory reach.32 For these reasons, among
29. See Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Agencies do
not ‘administer’ statutes confining the scope of their jurisdiction . . . .”); see also NRDC v.
Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that a “responsible Congress” would not give
an agency the authority to determine its own jurisdiction); id. at 200 (applying “a lesser degree of
deference than Chevron-level” to agency determination of its own jurisdiction when the statute is
ambiguous).
30. See Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[A]gencies can
claim no special expertise in interpreting a statute confining its jurisdiction.”); Ernest Gellhorn &
Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1009 (1999)
(stating that agencies are no better-equipped than the courts for interpreting statutes).
31. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 24, at 867 (noting that Chevron opens the potential
for “agency aggrandizement . . . without any effective judicial check” (footnote omitted)). Note
that, if a court determines that the agency’s position should not be accorded deference, the court
maintains or expands its own regulatory domain. Nevertheless, the argument favoring
regulatory expansionism by judges may be weaker than the argument favoring regulatory
expansionism by agencies. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and
the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 46 (2003) (“The judge writing an opinion will typically be limited
in his involvement to the specific case and will not reap any benefits ex post from greater
regulatory intervention.”). But see Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61
STAN. L. REV. 519, 541–42 & n.71 (2008) (noting the topical specialization by judges, including
Judge Frank Easterbrook, who specializes in corporate law and federal securities regulation).
One should also consider the possibility of an agency shirking its responsibility with regard to
portions of its congressionally delegated domain, perhaps for reasons of agency capture. See
infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text. But see Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. REV. 233, 252 (2004) (“Few have seriously
suggested that the SEC has been a ‘captive’ of the industries it regulates.”). Arguably, an
agency will seek to contract its regulatory empire to appease regulated entities, but a reviewing
court should not defer to such an interpretation. Even the unconscious bias of an administrator
may lead to overreaching by an agency based on a misperception of the agency’s core
competencies. Some scholars, however, argue that “[n]o sustained evidence justifies the
suggestion that when agencies make decisions on major questions, bias and self-interest are the
motivating factors.” Sunstein, supra note 14, at 233. Even if agency leaders suffer cognitive
biases, evidence suggests that judges also suffer from such biases. See Chris Guthrie et al.,
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 45 (2007) (noting that
judges may be influenced by cognitive biases despite their awareness of them).
32. See, e.g., 2 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1209 (4th ed. 2007)
(suggesting that the SEC “contends for a liberal application of this definition [of ‘security’]”);
Dean Foust, Is Breeden Too Ambitious for the SEC’s Good?, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1992, at
116 (criticizing the then-Chairman’s “aggressive campaigns to expand his agency’s power”); see
also Karmel, supra note 12, at 38 n.27 (“A high ranking SEC enforcement official once told me
he had no interest in leaving the Commission despite the financial rewards available in the private
sector because ‘now, every CEO in America will take my phone call.’”); Aguilar Calls for
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others, a court may owe no deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own
jurisdiction.33
However, the same arguments that support court deference to an agency’s
interpretation regarding non-jurisdictional matters still support court deference
to an agency’s interpretation of jurisdictional matters.34
As a preliminary matter, an issue is not always easily categorized as
jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. 35 Every interpretation of a statute
necessarily concerns that statute’s reach; thus, in a sense, every ambiguity
presents a jurisdictional question.36 For example, this Article concerns the
definition of “security” as a gateway issue to regulation by the SEC. A broad
definition of “security” expands the regulatory jurisdiction of the
Commission.37 Nevertheless, the Court had at one time accorded the SEC
deference on this issue.38 Notwithstanding the Court’s history of deference to
the Commission regarding the definition of “security,” every statutory
ambiguity becomes jurisdictional.39 Under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), Congress prohibited certain behavior
“in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security.40 If the disputed
behavior is “in connection with” a securities transaction, then the SEC may
regulate it, but if that behavior is not “in connection with” a securities
transaction, then the Commission must find other authority to regulate. Thus,
the phrase “in connection with” defines the Commission’s jurisdiction under
section 10(b). Despite the jurisdictional nature of the phrase “in connection
with,” and contrary to the Court’s recent definition-of-security cases, the Court
Enhanced SEC Enforcement, Including Authority to Bring Criminal Action, 41 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 492 (March 23, 2009) (setting forth the Commission’s position that
“Congress . . . expand the commission’s enforcement powers, including giving it the ‘standby
authority’ to bring criminal charges in cases in which the Justice Department does not act”).
33. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 234–35.
34. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 172–74 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(according Chevron deference to a Commission rule that narrowly defined a congressional
exemption, which arguably expanded the Commission’s jurisdiction).
35. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 235.
36. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 281 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no discernible line between an agency’s exceeding its
authority and an agency’s exceeding authorized application of its authority.”); see also Einer
Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2053–54
(2002) (arguing that every question regarding an administrative statute implicates the scope of the
administering agency’s jurisdiction); Garrett, supra note 14, at 2674 (acknowledging the
difficulty in defining what constitutes a jurisdictional question).
37. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943) (noting that the term
“security” “controls the scope of th[e] Act” (footnote omitted)); LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at
856 (“[T]he definition of security determines the reach of the federal securities laws.”).
38. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881,
891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2006)).
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accorded deference to the SEC’s interpretation of the ambiguous phrase.41
Logically, if the Court should defer to the Commission regarding the meaning
of “in connection with,” which defines the statute’s reach, the Court should
also defer to the SEC regarding the meaning of “security” as long as the
interpretation is reasonable.
Court deference to the Commission may be critical to achieving a federal
regulatory regime. Under a non-deferential regime, courts would more likely
reach different conclusions regarding statutory ambiguity. Consequently, the
SEC’s regulatory reach could differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
potentially giving rise to mischief. For example, courts have differed
regarding whether an instrument constitutes an “investment contract,” a term
that is among the laundry list of instruments that Congress identified as
“securities.”42 The SEC and the Court define “investment contract” as an
instrument reflecting certain criteria, including a common enterprise.43 If
there is no common enterprise, the instrument is not an “investment
contract,”44 and thus not a “security” (unless the instrument meets the criteria
of another item on Congress’s laundry list).45 It seems inapt to consider as
jurisdictional the issue of common enterprise. Arguably, a reviewing court
should highly value the SEC’s insights regarding what constitutes a common
enterprise. Eschewing the Commission’s position, however, courts have
become divided, with some circuits favoring “horizontal commonality,” which
requires more than one investor, and other circuits favoring “vertical
commonality,” the requirement of which may be met even if there is only one
investor.46 Thus, the same instrument could qualify as a “security” in one
circuit but not in a neighboring circuit, undermining the idea of federal
regulation.47
41. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (citing United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 229–30 n.12 (2001)); see also United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 319
(2009) (“This is the very situation in which we look to an authoritative agency for a decision
about the statute’s scope, which is defined in cases at the statutory margin by the agency’s
application of it, and once the choice is made we ask only whether the [agency]’s application was
reasonable.”).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘security’ means any . . . investment
contract . . . .”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) (same).
43. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (defining “investment
contract”).
44. See James D. Gordon III, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as
Securities, 69 TEX. L. REV. 383, 396 (1990) (stating that the Howey test requires each prong,
including “common enterprise,” to be met in order to establish an “investment contract”).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10).
46. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 929–39 (outlining circuit approaches to “horizontal”
and “vertical” commonality).
47. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1121 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “restricted capacity” to “give its own
precise renditions of statutory meaning” inhibits uniformity).
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Even if jurisdictional issues were always distinct from non-jurisdictional
issues, it is not clear that a court should withhold deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its own jurisdiction. Just as considerations of expertise and
political accountability favor court deference to an agency in non-jurisdictional
matters, the same considerations favor deference in jurisdictional matters.48
An agency’s intimate knowledge of the statute and the regulated/unregulated
trade-offs provides a valuable background against which to determine the
statute’s appropriate reach.49 As to congressional intent of the statute’s reach,
the agency has an ongoing relationship with Congress—offering testimony and
participating in the budgeting process—regarding the agency’s mission. That
relationship better enables the agency to determine its jurisdiction compared to
the courts, which have fewer contacts with Congress and almost certainly no
contacts with respect to the agency’s jurisdiction.50
Moreover, Congress entrusted the SEC to make regulatory decisions
involving policy trade-offs.51 Determining the appropriate reach of a statute
amounts to a policy decision; this is true regarding the definition of
“security.”52 Politically accountable agencies are better suited to make these
policy determinations compared to a politically insulated court.53
48. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 235–36.
49. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty,
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1036, 1059 (2006)
(“[S]tatutes that . . . address regulatory problems entailing significant risk-risk . . . tradeoffs may
be more effective if their different provisions are interpreted in a way that reflects a coherent,
consistent regulatory strategy, as conflicting interpretations create costs beyond those associated
with the substantive resolution of each particular issue. These conditions favor agency
delegation.” (footnotes omitted)); CFTC’s Chilton Calls for Agency to Have Criminal
Prosecution Authority, 77 U.S.L.W. 2491, 2491 (Feb. 17, 2009) (setting forth the commissioner’s
argument that securities enforcement should be done by experts instead of “DOJ prosecutors who
are more likely to be generalists, unfamiliar with the mechanics of derivatives trading and the
interstices of the Act and regulations”).
50. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 602 (2009) (“Unlike
courts, agencies have a continuous relationship with Congress and may have a better
understanding of the general aims of legislation.” (footnote omitted)).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) (“Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged
in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection
of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”).
52. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 856 (“[T]he definition of security determines the
reach of the federal securities laws. Thus, there is a policy dimension to how broadly or
narrowly the term security is defined.”).
53. See Beck v. Dobrowski, 559 F.3d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2009) (“It is a matter for the SEC to
consider if it wants, because it involves a delicate tradeoff best confided to specialists in the
securities markets.”); see also Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C. 1986)
(per curiam) (“It is not as obvious today as it seemed in the 1930s that . . . the decisions of such
agencies so clearly involve scientific judgement rather than political choice that it is even
theoretically desirable to insulate them from the democratic process.”), aff’d sub nom. Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 243 (asserting that agencies are best
suited to interpret ambiguous statutes due to their expertise and accountability).
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Deference to an agency regarding its own jurisdiction likely would result in
overlapping, or increasingly overlapping, regulation by multiple agencies.54
Some commentators, including former high-ranking agency officials, typically
disfavor having multiple regulators oversee portions of the whole, which is
particularly true regarding the financial industry.55 Empowering courts with
the ultimate authority to determine an agency’s jurisdiction, and to accord no
particular weight to the agency’s position in making that determination,
however, is no panacea. Agencies will continue to overreach their statutory
authority and battle over jurisdiction.56 In a non-deferential regime where
agencies have no accountability for the determination of their jurisdiction, the
agencies may adopt more aggressive positions. The agencies could deflect
jurisdictional criticism either to those who submit to the agency’s jurisdiction
without challenge or to the courts that uphold or reject the agency’s aggressive
position.57
Generally, Congress will know of an agency’s tendency to overreach,58 and
thus intentionally draft overlapping regulation on occasion.59 If overlapping
54. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that deference should not be given to an agency when the
statutory interpretation at issue involves that agency’s jurisdiction as well as the jurisdiction of
other agencies); Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 1989). Judge
Easterbook stated that, “[i]f each agency’s interpretation of its own statute is entitled to some
deference, then the [instrument] is both a security and a futures contract. It has some attributes
of both, and all attributes of neither, as we have laid out in excessive detail. Neither
characterization can be called wrong.” Chi. Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 548.
55. See Current, Former Officials Call for Streamlining of Financial Regulation, 41 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 567 (March 30, 2009) (arguing that “an ‘uber’ regulator
responsible for securities, commodities, and insurance products” should take charge of the
“piecemeal oversight” currently conducted by various agencies (quoting former SEC Chairman
Harvey Pitt)); see also Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, Regulator Schapiro to Run SEC for
Obama, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2008, at A15 (referencing the consolidation of the National
Association of Securities Dealers and certain regulatory and enforcement functions of the New
York Stock Exchange).
56. See Chi. Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 544 (discussing the recurrence of jurisdictional
disputes).
57. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57 (1999)
(“Legislators actually felt little responsibility to consider constitutional questions because they
relied on the courts to bail them out [if they overreached].” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To a certain extent, political accountability and subject matter expertise are inconsistent
constructs because, if one simply does the bidding of the President, Congress, or the majority,
then one may not have any incentive to attain the relevant expertise. See Matthew C.
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 57–58 (2008).
58. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (suggesting that Congress is aware that statutory ambiguity will be resolved
by agencies “whose policy biases will ordinarily be known”).
59. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 648–49 (1997) (discussing investigation by
the SEC and eventual prosecution by the DOJ); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-711, pt. 3, at 46–48
(2000) (“Chairman Levitt of the SEC and Chairman Rainer of the CFTC noted that these products
should be subject to joint regulation by both agencies. The Committee agrees.”); Schapiro
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regulation causes friction, 60 the President may be able to resolve these
conflicts even if the concern involves independent agencies rather than
executive agencies. 61 Alternatively, the agencies may resolve their own
disputes without intervention.62 Therefore, deference by a reviewing court to
an agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction may not be a cause for
concern.
Significantly, the SEC’s participation in a jurisdictional squabble that
potentially involves its own overreaching may be less troubling than similar
squabbles involving other agencies because of the Commission’s broad
exemptive powers. 63 Consequently, if problems result from jurisdictional
overreaching by the Commission, due to either redundant or unnecessary
regulation, the SEC could exempt the “security” or “class of securities” from
such regulatory provisions while continuing to fill regulatory gaps.
B. Sufficiency of the Commission’s Political Accountability64
1.

Accountability to the President

Because the Supreme Court has not addressed expressly the appropriate
deference, if any, that a court should accord to the views of an independent
Encourages Lawmakers to Seek Legislation for Rating Liability, Proxy Access, 41 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1345–46 (July 20, 2009) (discussing a White House legislative proposal
that contemplates joint regulation of derivatives by the SEC and CFTC).
60. In certain circumstances, overlapping regulation could prove beneficial. See, e.g.,
Daniel R. Fischel, Regulatory Conflict and Entry Regulation of New Futures Contracts, 59 J.
BUS. S85, S101 (1986) (arguing that “[t]he best alternative to no entry regulation would be
competition in entry regulation”).
61. See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
62. See Joint Order Excluding Indexes Comprised of Certain Index Options from the
Definition of Narrow-Based Security Index Pursuant to Section 1a(25)(b)(vi) of the Commodity
Exchange Act and Section 3(a)(55)(c)(vi) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-49469, 69 Fed. Reg. 16900, 16900–01 (Mar. 25, 2004); see also Chi. Mercantile
Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that agencies cannot alter their
jurisdiction by agreement when the alteration would clearly be contrary to the jurisdiction
Congress defined); Joint Order Excluding from the Definition of Narrow-Based Security Index
Those Security Indexes that Qualified for the Exclusion from that Definition Under Section
1a(25)(b)(v) of the Commodity Exchange Act and Section 3(a)(55)(c)(v) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46009, 67 Fed. Reg. 38941, 38941–42
(May 31, 2002).
63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-3; 78mm(a)(1) (2006); see also infra Part II.B.
64. The APA definition of “agency” includes independent commissions. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 551(1) (2006) (defining “‘agency’ [as] each authority of the Government of the United States”);
see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 525 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“The
Administrative Procedure Act . . . makes no distinction between independent
and other agencies . . . in the standards for reviewing agency action.” (citing 5 U.S.C. §§
701(b)(1), 706 (2006))). Consequently, there may be no reason to treat judicial review of
statutory interpretations by executive agencies differently than the statutory interpretations by
independent agencies.
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agency,65 Congress’s creation of the SEC as an independent agency, rather
than an executive agency, is significant.66 For example, the Chevron Court
deferred to an executive agency and, in crafting its analytical framework, it
repeatedly referred to the importance of political accountability. 67 The
Court’s emphasis on political accountability, and its express reference to the
executive branch, has led some scholars to conclude that, although a reviewing
court owes Chevron deference to an executive agency, courts need not accord
such deference to an independent agency.68

65. See Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron
Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 446 (2006) (“[I]t is somewhat surprising that the Court in
Chevron did not then, nor has it since, said anything explicit about Chevron’s applicability to
independent agencies.”). Nevertheless, the Court has applied precedent involving executive
agencies to cases involving independent agencies, and lower courts have applied Supreme Court
precedent involving independent agencies to cases involving executive agencies. See, e.g.,
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 534 (2002) (applying Chevron deference to the
FCC); Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial
Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 657, 697 & n.83 (2004) (collecting
cases that apply “[l]egal principles and tests established in cases involving executive agencies [to]
cases involving independent agencies, and vice versa”). The Court may specifically address this
gap in its jurisprudence during the 2012 Term. See City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 668 F.3d
229 (5th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012).
66. Some scholars suggest that Congress delegates to independent agencies when the
opposing party occupies the White House, or at least when the President’s preferences do not
align with those controlling Congress. See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF
AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997, at 27–28 (2003); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986
SUP. CT. REV. 41, 74. But see id. at 73 (“The failure of Congress to demonstrate a consistent
approach to agency independence is mirrored at the theoretical level by the absence of any
noncircular explanation for why independence is needed in a particular case.”). If true, then
members of Congress seem short-sighted, because there is relatively rapid turnover in the White
House. See Richard A. Posner, Editorial, The Probability of Catastrophe . . ., WALL ST. J., Jan.
4, 2005, at A12 (noting that “[p]oliticians [have] limited terms of office and thus foreshortened
political horizons”). Nonetheless, the argument seems misplaced with respect to the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act, which were passed under President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and
both the House of Representatives and the Senate featuring large Democratic majorities. It
merits mention, however, that FDR later sought to bring independent agencies under presidential
control. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 466–67 (2008) (discussing FDR’s
view of independent agencies as the “headless fourth branch of government”).
67. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (referencing the
“incumbent administration’s views of wise policy” and explaining that, “[w]hile agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices”).
68. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2377 (2001)
(“A Chevron-type doctrine attuned to the role of the President would respond to this disparity by
giving greater deference to executive than to independent agencies.”); May, supra note 65, at 453
(suggesting that “a reading of Chevron that accords less deference to independent agencies’
decisions than to those of executive branch agencies would be more consistent with our
constitutional system and its values”).

2013]

Court Deference to the SEC

287

Although a single administrator typically heads executive agencies, five
commissioners head the SEC, with no more than three coming from a single
The requisite bipartisan representation among SEC
political party. 69
commissioners lessens the likelihood that the Commission would implement
the President’s views. 70 Even though both executive administrators and
commissioners must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, 71 the President’s removal powers differ with respect to each.
Generally, the President may remove an executive administrator with or
without cause, 72 but the President’s ability to remove a commissioner is
limited to removal for cause,73 enhancing the commissioner’s independence
and lessening accountability to the President. Additionally, executive
administrators generally resign at the end of a President’s term, increasing the
likelihood that the political views of the next President and executive
In contrast, Congress provided SEC
administrators coincide. 74
commissioners with staggered, five-year terms so that some commissioners’
tenures will extend beyond the President’s term.75 These staggered terms
reduce the likelihood that the views of a newly elected President coincide with
each commissioner.
Moreover, commissioners—other than the
chairperson—exhibit an unwillingness to resign upon the election of a
president of a different political party.76
Further, the SEC is relatively detached from the executive branch regarding
its investigative and enforcement powers. The Commission may commence
investigations regarding violations of securities laws without consulting the
executive branch.77 Upon determining that such violations have occurred or
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006).
70. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 66, at 459 (noting the congressional intent to limit a
President’s control of independent agencies).
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).
72. See SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 682 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying
limited president-removal powers to SEC commissioners (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 624–26 (1935))).
73. Removal by the President is likely limited to “for cause” situations. See id.; see also
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (2010) (assuming
that a commissioner may be removed only for cause); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–93
(1988) (upholding the statutory “good cause” limitation on the Attorney General’s power to
remove independent counsel); Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624–26 (limiting the President’s
power to remove an FTC commissioner to those circumstances set forth by statute). Congress,
however, may be able to impeach commissioners. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
74. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 66, at 477.
75. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (setting four-year term for the President), with 15
U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (setting five-year, staggered terms for SEC commissioners).
76. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 66, at 490; see also SEC Historical Summary of
SEC.
&
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
Chairmen
and
Commissioners,
U.S.
http://sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2012).
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2006) (“The Commission may, in its discretion, make such
investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or
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are imminent, the SEC may unilaterally seek injunctive relief as well as
monetary penalties in federal district court.78 Additionally, the Commission
may pursue administrative adjudication of securities law violations. 79
Moreover, the SEC need not consult the executive branch when exercising its
rulemaking authority80 or when opining on pending or proposed legislation.81
The differences between an executive agency and an independent agency
appear overstated; 82 the President may exert substantial influence over
independent agencies.83 For example, although the President’s appointment
and removal powers limit executive influence over the SEC, those limitations
are exaggerated. 84 Though not required by statute, the Commission’s
chairperson traditionally resigns upon a change in administrations, allowing
is about to violate any provision of this chapter [or] the rules or regulations
thereunder . . . .” (emphasis added)).
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2006) (“Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any
person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a
violation of the provisions of this subchapter, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under
authority thereof, the Commission may in its discretion, bring an action in any district court of the
United States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. §
77t(d)–(e), (g) (providing for monetary and non-monetary penalties); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1)
(mirroring 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)); id. § 78u(d)(3) (providing for monetary penalties); Aulana L.
Peters, Independent Agencies: Government’s Scourge or Salvation?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 286, 287
(discussing the Commission’s independence).
79. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2006); Peters, supra note 78, at 287 (noting the SEC’s ability to
operate in a quasi-judicial capacity “without the advice or approval of either the executive or
legislative branch”); Glen O. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive
Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 242 (“Adjudications are insulated from influences outside the
hearing process by constitutional and statutory norms of due process that bind the President no
less than the ordinary citizen.”).
80. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical
Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 219 (stating that “[a]s to rulemaking and enforcement, the
President has no authority to influence any agency, executive or independent, to act contrary to its
statutory mandate”). Congress granted the Commission both targeted and generalized
rulemaking authority. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b), 78j, 78n(a) (2006) (targeted authority); see also
15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78w(a)(1) (2006) (generalized authority).
81. See 12 U.S.C. § 250 (2006) (“No officer or agency of the United States shall have any
authority to require the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . to submit legislative
recommendations, or testimony, or comments on legislation, to any officer or agency of the
United States for approval, comments, or review, prior to the submission of such
recommendations, testimony, or comments to the Congress if such recommendations, testimony,
or comments to the Congress include a statement indicating that the views expressed therein are
those of the agency submitting them and do not necessarily represent the views of the
President.”).
82. See Miller, supra note 80, at 218 (noting this exaggeration (citing Susan Bartlett Foote,
Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988
DUKE L.J. 223, 232–33)).
83. See Miller, supra note 66, at 43 (noting that some independent agencies are subject to
more executive branch control than some executive agencies).
84. See Seligman, supra note 31, at 239 (providing, as an example, that President Clinton’s
SEC appointments were largely based on political rationale rather than one’s qualifications).
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the newly elected President to influence the Commission’s direction.85 Even
though the chairperson is only one of five commissioners, he or she wields the
power to control the agenda, 86 potentially influencing outcomes. 87
Moreover, the chairperson controls the SEC’s purse, allocates business among
the Commission’s administrative units, and appoints the heads of those
administrative units. 88 Although the President may not have significant
influence over the commissioners regarding the SEC’s policies after their
confirmation by the Senate, the power of appointment should not be
underestimated as an executive means of guiding the Commission’s
direction.89
Cross-party resignations may not occur following a change in
administrations, but the SEC’s positions, over time, closely align with those of
the President. 90 Furthermore, the difference in independence between an
individual administrator and a multi-member commission may be exaggerated
because of the significant role played by career-line officers, whose influences

85. See Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175, 3175 (May 25, 1950),
reprinted in 64 Stat. 1265 (1950) (“The functions of the Commission with respect to choosing a
Chairman from among the commissioners composing the Commission are hereby transferred to
the President.”); see also Peters, supra note 78, at 288 n.6 (“Upon a change in administration, the
Chairman of the SEC is expected to tender his resignation to the new President.”); SEC Chairman
POST,
Jan.
20,
2009,
Cox
Resigns
as
SEC
Chairman,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/20/chris-cox-resigns-as-sec-_n_159548.html (noting that
the chairman’s resignation coincides with the inauguration of a President from a different party).
86. See Foust, supra note 32, at 115 (“In his two years as chairman of the Securities &
Exchange Commission, Breeden has broadened the agency’s enforcement agenda and pushed a
flurry of tough new regulations.”); see also Miller, supra note 66, at 80 & n.146 (“[T]he chairman
of an independent agency is in theory only first among equals. . . . Agency chairmen, however, do
often enjoy considerably greater powers because of their prestige in Congress, their access to the
press, and their control over internal housekeeping matters such as staffing or budget.”); Peters,
supra note 78, at 288 (noting that the chairperson has “general control of the Commission’s
calendar”). But see Karmel, supra note 11, at 41 (identifying a period at the SEC during which
“the Enforcement Division dominated the Commission and to a significant extent set its agenda”).
87. See Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63
VA. L. REV. 561, 564–65 (1977) (arguing that agenda influences outcomes); see also Christopher
Long & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Winning the Contest by Agenda Manipulation, 2 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 123, 124–25 (1982) (same). For example, former SEC Chairman Breeden
was accused of refusing to process a matter on which a retiring commissioner had provided the
swing vote, so as to nullify that critical vote in hopes of achieving a different outcome with a
newly confirmed commissioner. See Foust, supra note 32, at 116.
88. See Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. at 3175.
89. See Peters, supra note 78, at 288 (discussing President Reagan’s implementation of a
deregulatory scheme by his appointment of like-minded commissioners); see also Robinson,
supra note 79, at 245 (asserting that “implicit in the selection itself is the choice of persons who
will continue to be responsive to future presidential preferences”).
90. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 66, at 492.
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have shaped the SEC’s policies.91 The far-reaching knowledge base, the
practical experience, and the intimate familiarity of the relevant facts of career
line-officers frequently enable them to successfully advocate positions that are
accepted by the ultimate authority—whether an administrator or a
multi-member commission—commonly without modification.92
The independence of the SEC from the executive branch may also be
overstated with respect to its investigative and enforcement powers.
Although the SEC is not required to consult with the executive branch before
or regarding an investigation, the Commission may voluntarily consult with
executive branch representatives to preserve limited resources or coordinate
across agencies.93 Because the Commission lacks criminal authority, it refers
particularly egregious violations of the federal securities laws to the Attorney

91. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 38 (emphasizing the enforcement staffs’ role in shaping
the Commission’s policies); see also Miller, supra note 66, at 80 (“The expertise that makes a
difference in particular cases will be concentrated in the career staff of an agency . . . .”).
92. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 41 (“[T]he staff controls the factual record which is
presented to the Commission.” (footnote omitted)); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause
Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 121 (1997) (arguing that “[t]he employees with the
most immediate access to basic information are almost always line personnel”); James G. March
& Martha S. Feldman, Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
171, 176 (1981) (stating that “[o]ften, information is produced in order to persuade someone”);
Miller, supra note 66, at 80 (“[T]he recommendations of the career officer will be reviewed by
‘policy-making’ officials higher up in the chain of authority. And in the vast majority of cases,
in both independent and executive agencies, the staff recommendations are accepted by the
agency heads without change.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1188 (1997) (“Often people make probability judgments on the basis of an initial
value, or ‘anchor,’ from which they make insufficient adjustments. The initial value may have
an arbitrary or irrational source.” (footnote omitted)).
93. See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2003) (creating an inter-agency working
group composed of executive and independent agencies); see also OFFICE OF
CHIEF COUNSEL, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 108
(2008) (discussing the Commission’s “[c]ooperation and coordination with other law enforcement
agencies”); id. at 110 (“[The Commission] staff is encouraged to work cooperatively with
criminal authorities, to share information, and to coordinate their investigations with parallel
criminal investigations when appropriate.”); Andre Hruska, The President’s Corporate Fraud
Task Force, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., May 2003, at 1, 2 (“[M]embers of the interagency group
communicate frequently outside of the Task Force meetings on policy and, where appropriate,
operational matters as they arise.”).
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General for prosecution. 94 After doing so, the SEC occasionally details
members of its staff to assist in the prosecution of the referred cases.95
Despite the independence of litigation in the lower courts, the Commission
loses independence and influence when a matter reaches the Supreme Court,
where the executive branch has the final say as to the government’s position.96
Commonly, the SEC and the executive branch agree regarding the appropriate
resolution of the issue presented,97 but, on those occasions of disagreement,
the executive branch presents the government’s position to the Court. 98
Additionally, the influence of the executive branch is not limited to silencing
the Commission. For purposes of briefing and argument before the Court, the
executive branch, on at least one occasion, required the SEC to reverse its own
previously articulated position before the lower courts.99
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2006) (“The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be
available concerning such acts or practices to the Attorney General who may, in his discretion,
institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this subchapter.”); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2006) (virtually identical); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges
Ex-Worldcom CEO Bernard Ebbers; Former Worldcom CFO Scott Sullivan Pleads Guilty (Mar.
24, 2004) (announcing the indictment and guilty plea of corporate fraudsters and thanking the
Commission for its assistance in the investigation), available at https://www2.fbi.gov/dojpressrel
/pressrel04/world030204.htm.
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 543 (2006) (empowering the U.S. Attorney to appoint attorneys to assist
AUSAs); see also, e.g., United States v. Wencke, 604 F.2d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
Wall v. United States, 384 F.2d 758, 763 (10th Cir. 1967).
96. Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society Fireside Chat–Courts and the
SEC (Apr. 17, 2007) (statement of Paul Gonson, former Solicitor, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n)
[hereinafter Fireside Chat], transcript available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud
.com/collection/programs/Transcrip_2007_0417_FC.pdf.
97. Id. (“Generally, the Solicitor General will defer to the SEC with regard to the position
and the Solicitor General’s staff will do some editing of the brief [originally drafted by the
SEC].”). As evidence of an agreement, the DOJ and SEC generally file a joint merits brief with
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
1, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (06-484), 2007 WL 460606;
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S 71 (2006) (No. 04-1371), 2005 WL 3048038; Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 2069564; Brief of Petitioner at 1, SEC v. Edwards, 540
U.S. 389 (2004) (No. 02-1196), 2003 WL 21498455; Brief of Petitioner at 1, SEC v. Zandford,
535 U.S. 813 (2002) (No. 01-147), 2001 WL 1663770.
98. See Linda Greenhouse, Skeptically, Court Hears Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2007, at C1, C11( “While the S.E.C. is an independent agency, it needs authorization from the
solicitor general to file a Supreme Court brief.”). Greenhouse refers to the Stoneridge case, in
which the Commission supported a position advocated by plaintiffs, but the Bush Administration
advocated a position favoring defendants before the Court. See id.
99. See Fireside Chat, supra note 96 (“PAUL GONSON: . . . In the lower courts, the courts
of appeals, the SEC and the FDIC had taken opposite positions on [whether the instrument was a
‘security’]. One of these cases, the Marine Bank case, came to the Supreme Court. The
Solicitor General then invited the general counsels of the SEC and the three banking regulators to
a suite in his office, locked the door, and said you guys aren’t coming out until you agree on a
common position that you’ll all sign in the Supreme Court.”). Little consolation flows from the
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Congressional enactments may provide statutory cover, but the Commission
does not insulate itself from the influence of the executive branch with respect
to its rulemaking authority.100 In fact, the SEC has worked repeatedly with
After the enactment of the
executive agencies in this regard. 101
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Commission worked with the Treasury
Department in crafting new rules.102 Following Black Monday—the stock
market break of October 1987—as the SEC prepared to propose legislation,
President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order that created a working
group composed of executive administrators and independent commissioners,
which effectively prevented the Commission from taking action independently
until the group had issued a report to him.103
Finally, the President proposes the budget for agencies, including the SEC’s
allocation thereof. Thus, the Commission must, to a certain extent, appease
the President in its actions lest it risk being short-changed.104 Even if an
executive administrator is more responsive than a commission to the President,
it need not be the case that courts can avoid Chevron deference to the views of
an independent agency. Even those who oppose a court’s application of
Chevron to independent agencies concede that some lesser deference may be
appropriate.105

fact that the Commission extracted from the DOJ footnotes that limited the arguments presented.
See id.
100. See Peters, supra note 78, at 287 (“[A]s a matter of prudence and courtesy the
Commission does consult with other agencies of government in formulating major legislative
positions.”); see also Foust, supra note 32, at 116 (describing Chairman Breeden’s “efforts to
ingratiate himself with the White House” by “shift[ing] course, or at least his emphasis, on
several key policy issues to promote the Bush Administration agenda during an election year”);
Colleen M. Kelley, Letter to the Editor, Don’t Blame the SEC’s Employees, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13,
2009, at A12 (“[F]ront-line employees . . . have been hampered from fulfilling the [SEC’s]
mission[] by leaders under the previous administration who were, at best, ambivalent about
agency missions.”).
101. See Peters, supra note 78, at 287 (noting that the SEC works with other agencies).
102. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1807–08 (2007).
103. See Exec. Order No. 12,631, 3 C.F.R. 559 (1989); see also Jerry W. Markham & Rita
McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987—The United States Looks at New
Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 2028 n.227 (1988) (“The agencies did not introduce
proposals partly because they were awaiting the formation of the Presidential Working Group.”);
Peters, supra note 78, at 293 (stating that Executive Order 12,631 temporarily “enjoined” the
Commission).
104. Seligman, supra note 31, at 253 (“The SEC . . . submits its budget to the White House
Office of Management and Budget, which consolidates several agency budgets into a single
request.”).
105. See Kagan, supra note 68, at 2377 n.506 (arguing that the “adoption of the proposal
offered here need not entail the elimination of all deference to independent agencies”).
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Accountability to Congress

In Chevron, the Court partially justified ceding interpretive authority to an
administrative agency because such agencies have greater political
Although the Chevron Court
accountability than federal courts. 106
specifically referenced executive agencies, which are accountable to the
President, who, in turn, is accountable to the country,107 the Chevron Court did
not discuss whether the requisite political accountability might come from
congressional—rather than presidential—oversight. 108 Even if they are
independent of the executive, independent agencies nevertheless may be
sufficiently politically accountable to Congress so as to warrant deference from
reviewing courts regarding interpretations of the ambiguous statutes that they
administer. 109 Accountability may arise through Congress’s confirmation
power, power of the purse, and power to compel testimony, as well as through
Congress’s ultimate legislative authority.110
Through its confirmation power, Congress plays an influential role in the
SEC’s composition because the Senate offers advice to the President regarding
106. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
107. See id. at 865 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices . . . .”).
108. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (plurality opinion)
(“The independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often
been observed that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been
replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at
525 (“The Administrative Procedure Act, which provides judicial review, makes no distinction
between independent and other agencies, neither in its definition of agency, nor in the standards
for reviewing agency action.” (citations omitted)).
109. See WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (1967)
(“Government regulatory commissions are often referred to as ‘independent’ agencies, but this
cannot be taken at face value by anyone who has ever had any experience in Washington. In
fact, government regulatory agencies are stepchildren whose custody is contested by both
Congress and the Executive, but without very much affection from either one.”); see also
Bressman, supra note 102, at 1806 (“[T]he Court may ensure that Congress can use
administrative procedures to control independent agencies.”); Karmel, supra note 12, at 43 (“At
least while I was a Commissioner, the SEC did not consider itself as independent of congress as it
did of the White House.”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 100 (1994) (“It is not as obvious today as it seemed in the
1930s that there can be such things as genuinely ‘independent’ regulatory agencies, bodies of
impartial experts whose independence from the President does not entail correspondingly greater
dependence upon the committees of Congress to which they are then immediately accountable . . .
.”); Miller, supra note 80, at 218 (noting that “studies . . . suggest that independent agencies may
be somewhat more responsive to Congress”).
110. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 525 n.5 (noting the “extrastatutory influence Congress
exerts over agencies . . . which is exerted by the congressional committees responsible for
oversight and appropriations with respect to the relevant agency”); see also Scalia, supra note 58,
at 518 (“Under Chevron, . . . [a statutory ambiguity] can mean a range of things, and it is up to the
agency, in light of . . . political pressures that it feels from Congress . . . to specify the correct
meaning.”).
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nominees, and no nominee can become a commissioner without the Senate’s
consent.111 Recent Presidents have given surprising import to the “advice” of
Senate leaders of the rival party in nominating minority positions on the
Commission. 112 During the confirmation process, the Senate may “exact
promises from nominee[s],” 113 increasing the likelihood that a nominee’s
regulatory vision adequately aligns with that of a majority of senators.
Although Congress empowered the chairperson to appoint directors of the
Commission’s various divisions,114 Congress may lean on the chairperson to
influence those appointments.115
The SEC responds to congressional influence because Congress controls the
purse. 116 The Commission is one of the few agencies whose revenues
historically have exceeded its expenses, but it does not retain the revenue that
it collects. 117 The revenue goes to the federal fisc, and the SEC must
convince Congress to allocate to it enough money to cover its expenses.118
111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 881, 885
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)).
112. See Seligman, supra note 31, at 257 (stating that recently “Senate leaders of the leading
other political party have proposed the minority of the commissioners representing the rival
political party”).
113. Peters, supra note 78, at 288.
114. See Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175, 3175 (May 25, 1950),
reprinted in 64 Stat. 1265 (1950).
115. See Enforcement Chief Thomsen Leaving SEC; Deutsche Bank Lawyer Seen as
Successor, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 7. at 246 (Feb. 16, 2009) (“[G]iven the anger of
many in Congress at the enforcement program, and criticisms, however unfair, from many
quarters including the Commission’s own inspector general, [Chairperson] Mary Schapiro has to
make a visible change in the leadership and direction of the division or lose her own credibility
with Congress.” (quoting an unnamed securities attorney)); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Top
Enforcer at the S.E.C. Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at B1 (discussing the new
Chairperson’s acceptance of the Director of Enforcement’s resignation “amid blistering criticism
that the commission had failed to protect investors in recent years”).
116. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.
502, 525 n.5 (2009) (plurality opinion) (noting the “extrastatutory influence Congress exerts over
agencies . . . which is exerted by the congressional committees responsible for . . . appropriations
with respect to the relevant agency”); Seligman, supra note 31, at 234 (“Congress generally
prefers control of budgetary purse strings as a technique to control how the independent
regulatory agencies function.”).
117. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f(b), 78ee (2006); see also Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997: Hearing on H.R. 3814 Before a Subcomm. of
the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 704, 713 (1996) (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (“[T]he SEC has been a net contributor to the U.S.
Treasury, collecting more in fees than was necessary to cover its budget in every year since
1983.”); Peters, supra note 78, at 294; Seligman, supra note 31, at 239 (reporting that the fees
collected by the Commission in 1993 were twice the funds allocated by Congress and that in 2001
its fee collections were more than five times the amount appropriated to it).
118. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”); see also Fiscal 2009 Appropriations:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Services and General Government of the S. Comm.
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Consequently, Congress employs the budgetary process to ensure that the
Commission is fulfilling its congressional mission. 119 By shortening the
period during which Congress budgets funds to the SEC, Congress has
enhanced the effectiveness of this monitoring mechanism and increased the
Commission’s accountability.120
In addition to addressing budgetary matters, representatives of the
SEC—typically the chairperson and division directors—testify frequently
before Congress regarding regulatory shortcomings and potential remedies
thereof. 121 Congress continually monitors the Commission, even if such
monitoring varies in intensity over time—arguably less intense during market
booms and more intense during market busts.122
As is typical following a market drop, previously undiscovered frauds are
illuminated. For example, following the precipitous market drop in late 2008,
Congress convened several hearings during which representatives of the SEC
appeared, with members of Congress lambasting the Commission for
shortcomings in its enforcement.123 Of particular note was the $50 billion
fraud perpetrated by Bernard Madoff that ensnared the likes of Elie Wiesel,
on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 349–52 (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
As a caveat, recently Congress authorized the use of disgorgement funds, such that certain
fines previously collected by the Commission (and paid to the federal fisc) may be paid to
disgorgement funds to remedy harms suffered by investors. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784–85 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201
(2006)).
119. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 43 (“Members of Congress who head up oversight
committees can cause an agency like the SEC a great deal of aggravation or can benefit the
agency through budgetary largess . . . .”); see also Peters, supra note 78, at 294 (“It is neither
unusual nor inappropriate for Congress to use the budget process to ensure that an agency is
fulfilling its statutory mandate.”).
120. Compare S. REP. NO. 100-105, at 2 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2087, 2090
(describing the necessity of legislation and stating that “the expanding responsibilities and
workload of the Commission as well as recurring revelations of improprieties in the financial
markets cast doubt on the wisdom of making a 3 year appropriation in today’s environment.
The Subcommittee believes that it should have greater involvement in overseeing the SEC’s
operations . . . . Accordingly, the Subcommittee believes a 2 year authorization is appropriate.”),
with supra note 118 (noting the chairman’s annual appearances before congressional
appropriations subcommittees).
121. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 523–24 & n.4; see also SEC
Congressional Testimony, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://sec.gov/news/testimony.shtml (last
modified Dec. 12, 2012) (archiving prepared testimony before Congress by representatives of the
Commission from 1995 to present).
122. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 43 (noting Congress’s use of appropriations as a means of
oversight that fluctuates over time).
123. See More Effective SEC Changes Recommended by Commerce, 24 CORP. COUNS.
WKLY. 52, 53 (2009) (“The SEC’s belated discovery of Bernard Madoff’s alleged Ponzi scheme
has prompted lawmakers, in three hearings since January, to focus on the Division of
Enforcement’s handling of complaints and sharing of information among themselves, with the
commission, and with other regulators.”).
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Steven Spielberg, and John Malkovich. 124 After a hearing in which
“[s]ecurities regulators could not cool the white-hot Congressional fury”
regarding the Commission’s “failure to act on tips that might have exposed the
Madoff scandal,” Chairwoman Mary L. Schapiro requested a meeting with the
House Financial Services subcommittee to “work out ‘a course forward’ that
would provide accountability and maintain the integrity of continuing
Two days later, Shapiro convened meetings with
investigations.” 125
commissioners and senior SEC staff to “reinvigorate the SEC’s enforcement
program, including improving the handling of tips and whistleblower
complaints . . . .”126 Less than two weeks after Congress excoriated the
Commission for its decades-long failure to pursue allegations of the Madoff
fraud, the Commission followed up on another case with a history of fraud
allegations by charging R. Allen Stanford and affiliates with financial fraud.127
Congress’s influence over the Commission is not limited to enforcement
matters.
Because Congress can revise, supplement, or reverse any
administrative rule,128 the Commission remains accountable to Congress when
it acts in a quasi-legislative capacity.129 Congress monitors the SEC130 and
may either impede the Commission’s rulemaking or induce the Commission to

124. See id.; see also Richard Hill & Yin Wilczek, Enforcement Chief Thomsen Leaving
SEC: Beutsche Bank Lawyer Seen as Successor, in 41 SECURITIES REGULATION & LAW 245, 245
(BNA, Feb. 16, 2009) (reporting Madoff’s confession to senior Commission staffers that his
investment business was actually a Ponzi scheme); Lynnley Browning, Madoff Victims Will Get a
Tax Break, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at B3 (identifying some of Madoff’s victims).
125. Diana B. Henriques, At Madoff Hearing, Lawmakers Lay into S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2009, at B1, B10.
126. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to Practising Law
Institute’s “SEC Speaks in 2009” Program (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/s
peech/2009/spch020609mls.htm.
127. See Glenn R. Simpson et al., Madoff Case Led SEC to Intensify Stanford Probe, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A14; see also Karmel, supra note 12, at 43 (“While the Enforcement
Division probably would not quash an investigation because of congressional pressure, the staff
can and does begin and pursue investigations because of it.”).
128. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
129. Even though Congress has authority to revise, supplement, or reverse an administrative
rule, it may choose not to invoke that authority. Congress’s legislative attention is focused on
many matters outside the realm of the securities laws. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
Additionally, Congress has impediments to enacting legislation. See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 720
(1992) (noting that “to succeed, a bill must survive a gauntlet of veto gates”). Congress only
periodically passes new securities legislation, see Seligman, supra note 31, at 251, but
periodically does not mean never. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 1103 (discussing
congressional amendment to definition of “security”).
130. See Bressman, supra note 50, at 603 (“Congress maintain[s] active interest in agency
decision making as it unfolds.” (citing Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1804–13 (2007))).
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promulgate rules.131 The SEC is sufficiently accountable to Congress to merit
court deference.132 Albeit infrequently and without explication, the Court has
relied on the Chevron framework when deciding cases involving an
independent agency.133
C. Public Versus Private Enforcement
The Supreme Court commonly favors SEC interpretations when the agency
is enforcing federal securities laws, 134 but the Commission’s positions in
private securities litigation do not fare as well before the Court.135 Some
scholars suggest that, when private parties litigate, the Commission is neither
acting in its enforcement nor its rulemaking capacity and, thus, its position
commands no deference from a reviewing court, 136 whereas the SEC’s
131. See SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (requiring
clear identification of the problem to be addressed by the Commission’s regulation as well as
clear articulation of the costs and benefits of that regulation); see also Peters, supra note 78, at
294 (criticizing Congress’s attempts to impede the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and
Retrieval (EDGAR) initiative by “impos[ing] significant restrictions on the Commission’s ability
to finance the system . . . [and also] impos[ing] time-consuming reporting and certification
requirements”); Seligman, supra note 31, at 242–43 (describing Congress’s deregulatory bent and
stating that the “Commission would have to backpedal by administrative action to reduce the
likelihood of more deregulatory legislation”).
132. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (plurality opinion)
(stating that “independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it
has often been observed that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has
simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction” and also noting that
“[t]he Administrative Procedure Act, which provides judicial review, makes no distinction
between independent and other agencies, neither in its definition of agency, nor in the standards
for reviewing agency action.” (citations omitted)).
133. See, e.g., id. at 525; Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501–02 (2002).
134. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (“[The Commission’s]
interpretation of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal adjudication, is entitled to
deference if it is reasonable” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 & n.12
(2001))); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (“Because Congress has
authorized the Commission, in § 14(e), to prescribe legislative rules, we owe the Commission’s
judgment ‘more than mere deference or weight.’ . . . [W]e must accord the Commission’s
assessment ‘controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
statute.’” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S.
416, 424–26 (1977); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984))).
135. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) (collecting cases in
which the Supreme Court has refused to apply the SEC’s statutory interpretations of some of the
provisions of the Securities Acts).
136. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (discussing deference in a public, not private, enforcement
action); see also Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(b)
and the Elements of Rule 10b-5: Reflections on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH.
U. L. REV. 667, 695 (2004) (“Congress delegated authority to the SEC to prohibit certain
conduct—it did not delegate authority to create private rights of action. The question of how far
to extend the private action is in essence a question of federal common law.”). Additionally,
following the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), the
Court has accorded the Commission’s positions little weight with respect to ambiguities in that
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positions in public enforcement actions should command such deference.
Certainly, there are some issues of federal securities regulation that are
distinctly public and some issues that are distinctly private.137 Emphasis on
the public/private distinction, however, is misplaced. A court’s deference to
an agency’s interpretation depends on the issue at hand, not necessarily

statute. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); see also Bressman, supra note 50, at 579 (“Congress likely intended courts to interpret
the PSLRA or at least knew that they would. The explanation is straightforward: courts have
been the primary interpreters of securities law in the context of private class actions.” (footnote
omitted)).
137. For example, consider Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, which serves as the workhorse for both public and private securities litigation. See
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: SECTION 703 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: STUDY AND REPORT ON VIOLATIONS BY SECURITIES
PROFESSIONALS 9 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox703report.pdf (listing
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as the two most frequently enforced provisions of the federal
securities laws); see also Nat Stern, The Constitutionalization of Rule 10b-5, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 1,
1 (1995) (asserting that “Rule 10b-5 is probably the most familiar and most frequently invoked
securities regulation [which was] [p]romulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934” (footnotes omitted)).
Aiding-and-abetting liability is a distinctly public action, meaning private litigants cannot
successfully charge defendants with having aided and abetted securities violations of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007);
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (“[W]e hold
that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”). Only the
government may pursue aiding-and-abetting charges against those defendants. See 15 U.S.C. §
78t(e) (2006).
However, some issues that may arise in private securities litigation will not arise in the
Commission’s enforcement actions. For instance, although a private plaintiff must establish that
he or she relied on the defendant’s misstatement or omission in an action under Section 10(b), the
Commission need not establish such reliance. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 156 (2008) (noting the elements a private plaintiff must
establish for a cause of action under Section 10(b)); STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 315 (2005). Additionally, private plaintiffs
must have purchased or sold securities to have standing to pursue their Section 10(b) claims, but
the Commission is not similarly encumbered. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975) (imposing a standing requirement for private actions); see also
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 664 (limiting the standing requirement to private actions); SEC v. Nat’l
Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 n.9 (1969) (same). Further, private plaintiffs must have pursued
such claims within a limitations period, but this period does not apply to actions by the SEC.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006); see also Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 356–58 (1991)
(interpreting a predecessor statute); SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1488–90 (9th Cir. 1993).
When resolving the foregoing issues in private enforcement cases, the Court rejected the
Commission’s positions without reference to Skidmore or Chevron deference. See Lampf, 501
U.S at 361 (rejecting, without any reference to Chevron, the Commission’s proposed five-year
limitations period for a private action under Section 10(b)); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 197–98 (1975) (rejecting, without any reference to Skidmore, the Commission’s
interpretation of what constitutes a “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance”); Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 738, 746 n.10 (1975) (rejecting, without any reference to Skidmore, the
Commission’s interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
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whether that issue arises in private or public litigation.138 In fact, the Court
has deferred to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity when that
ambiguity has arisen in private litigation.139
Even if there were merit to the public/private distinction, the distinction
seems irrelevant in definition-of-security cases. Though some issues may be
distinctly private or public, many issues apply to causes of action whether
those actions are private or public.140 For example, under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, the defendant’s deception must have been “in
connection with” a securities transaction whether a private litigant or the
government pursued that defendant.141 Most pertinent to this Article, the
requirement that the instrument offered or sold must have been a “security”
straddles both private and public realms. A court’s holding regarding the
definition of “security” affects public enforcement, whether the issue arises in
private litigation or not. 142 A holding in a private action that is overly
cramped unduly limits the Commission and prevents its own enforcement
efforts.143 According deference to the SEC in a public enforcement action
138. See Bressman, supra note 50, at 579 (arguing that “courts [sh]ould focus on legislative
reasons for interpretive delegation by examining the nature of the issue”).
139. See Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 12–18
(2004) (according Skidmore deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutory ambiguity); see
also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–49 (2003) (same);
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (expressing willingness to accord Skidmore
deference to an agency’s opinion letter, but ultimately finding the agency’s interpretation
unpersuasive); Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 722–25 (1989) (according Chevron deference
to an agency’s interpretation of statutory ambiguity).
140. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007); Stoneridge, 552
U.S. at 156; SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–25 (2002); O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–59.
142. See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (No. 83-1961), 1984 WL 565898, at *3 (“The resolution of
[the ‘security’ issue] will not only affect private litigation but could also significantly affect
enforcement actions brought by the Commission.”); see also Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 3–4, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (No. 104), 1967 WL
113740, at *3–4 (“The decision of the court of appeals that [the instrument] is not a ‘security’ as
defined in that Act . . . would seem to preclude the Commission from acting for [investors’]
protection.”).
143. See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4–5, Tcherepnin, 389
U.S. 332 (No. 104), 1967 WL 113740, at *4–5 (“[T]he restrictive meaning the court of appeals
has given to the statutory definition of the term ‘security,’ if allowed to stand, would seriously
hamper the Commission’s efforts to deal with novel types of financial instruments as they
appear.”); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (No. 74-157) (“The construction of the term
‘security’ in these acts necessarily determines their applicability in Commission enforcement
actions. . . . The Commission opposes restrictive constructions of the securities laws and of the
Commission’s rules that would weaken the protections they afford investors and narrowly restrict
the range of circumstances to which they apply.”).
In resolving a private suit under Rule 10b-5, which proscribes the making of “any untrue
statement”, the Supreme Court recently determined that one must have “ultimate authority” for a
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regarding a particular issue,144 but failing to accord any deference to the
Commission for the same issue that arises in a private action is troublingly
inconsistent because both speak to the Commission’s reach. Finally,
emphasis on public-versus-private enforcement fails to capture the entirety of
the Chevron Court’s discussion of administering the statute, 145 which
contemplates both agency adjudication and rulemaking.146
That an issue arises in private litigation should not determine whether a
court accords deference to the SEC. If the issue arises in private litigation, a
court should accord deference to the Commission’s interpretation based upon
familiar considerations such as whether the Commission promulgated a rule
that addresses the issue following the appropriate notice-and-comment
procedures or whether the SEC previously resolved the issue in a formal
adjudication.147
II. STATUTORY INDICATIONS OF INTERPRETIVE DELEGATION
Congress envisioned some malleability in securities laws, intending that the
SEC mold regulation in certain circumstances.148 However, with respect to
the definition of “security,” statutory interpretation arguments cut both ways.
Some scholars argue that Congress delegated interpretive authority to the
Commission, but others argue that Congress delegated this authority to the
Given each argument’s persuasiveness, the Court should
courts. 149
statement in order to be held accountable. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also Janus Capital
Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011). Thus, one corporate entity
that crafted a statement would not be accountable if a second affiliated entity made the statement
with the approval of its managing board. See id. The Court’s interpretation of the phrase
“make any untrue statement,” may inhibit the SEC’s pursuit of those involved in securities fraud.
See Alert Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Supreme Court Limits
Liability for False Statements Under Rule 10b-5 to Those with “Ultimate Authority” for Them, at
3 (June 20, 2011) (discussing Janus Capital’s effect on Commission enforcement).
144. See, e.g., Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819–20 (according deference to the SEC in its
enforcement action).
145. The Chevron Court spoke of “an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers,” and also of “an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842, 865 (1984).
146. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78w(a)(1) (2006); see also O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673; supra
note 134.
147. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
148. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (“The Commission shall have authority from time to time
to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter”); id. § 78w(a)(1) (“The Commission . . . shall . . . have power to
make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions
of this chapter for which [it is] responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in [it] by
this chapter . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5 (1934) (noting that administrative flexibility is
essential in regulating the “modern stock exchange,” but the limits of the entrusted agency’s
authority should be clear).
149. Compare David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 216 (“Judges can put into effect congressional decisions about the scope of
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hold—and, according to at least one Justice, the Court has held—that, when
there is ambiguity, “Chevron’s rule of deference applies to an agency’s . . .
interpretation of its own statutory authority or jurisdiction.” 150 Further,
Congress has provided additional indications that it intended to give the SEC
interpretive authority to define its own jurisdiction, including: the
Commission’s power to define terms, its exemptive power, the context clause
preceding the definition of “security,” and the significance of Congress’s
overlapping, circular definition of “security.”
A.

The Commission’s Authority to Define Terms

In determining whether Congress intended for the Commission to serve as
the primary interpreter of uncertainties regarding the definition of “security,” it
is essential to examine the responsibilities with which Congress charged the
SEC. Congress delegated the authority to define terms in both the Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Exchange Act to the SEC. 151
Specifically, Congress empowered the Commission to define “technical and
trade terms” used in the Securities Act and “technical, trade, . . . and other
terms” used in the Exchange Act. 152 Although Congress itself defined
the Chevron doctrine only if Congress, as an initial matter, makes these decisions.”), with
Bressman, supra note 50, at 551 (stating that “when courts find no ‘clear’
meaning for the statutory text . . . they infer a delegation of interpretive authority to the
agency”).
150. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380–81 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Scalia, supra note 58, at 517 (“Congress now
knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved,
within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency,
whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.” (emphasis added)). Other Justices agree with
Justice Scalia. United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) (stating that the Court
should look to an agency for interpretation of a statute’s scope and accept that application if it is
reasonable).
151. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 77s (“The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this subchapter, including rules and regulations . . . defining accounting, technical, and trade
terms used in this title.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (2006) (“The Commission . . . as to matters within
[its] jurisdiction[], shall have power by rules and regulations to define technical, trade,
accounting, and other terms used in this chapter, consistently with the provisions and purposes of
this chapter.”).
Congress did not empower the Commission to define only trade terms and technical terms, but
also accounting terms. See 15 U.S.C. § 77s (“The Commission shall have authority from time to
time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this title, including rules and regulations . . . defining accounting, technical, and
trade terms used in this subchapter.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (2006) (substantially similar).
The inclusion of accounting terms should neither cabin the SEC’s power to define terms in order
to provide indirect guidance about the meaning of “security” nor prevent courts from according
deference to that guidance. Although accounting is a field that includes technical and trade
terms, an interpretation that limits those terms to the field of accounting would render their
inclusion as surplusage. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825,
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“security,” in so doing, it created a laundry list of more than twenty different
financial instruments that comprise the definition.153 Thus, the definitional
dilemma is not as simple as determining what constitutes a “security,” because
837 (1988) (“[W]e are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which
renders superfluous another portion of that same law.” (footnote omitted)); see also Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the canon noscitur a
sociis, meaning “a word is known by the company it keeps,” is not an obligation on the Court “to
construe every term in a series narrowly because of the meaning given to just one of the terms”
(citations omitted)). Admittedly, an argument favoring such a narrow construction finds some
support in the Securities Act. As originally enacted, the Securities Act delegated the power to
define only “accounting and trade terms.” Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 19, 48 Stat. 74, 85 (1933).
Immediately thereafter, Congress delegated to the Commission the authority to detail disclosures
regarding accounting matters. Congress empowered the Commission to determine the items to
be included in the balance sheets and earnings statements generally described by Congress and,
among other things, the appropriate methods of valuation and depreciation. See id. At first
look, the grant of the power to define is immediately followed by detailed powers limited to
matters of accounting, suggesting a narrow reading of the power to define.
Upon closer inspection, however, the Court should not construe the power to define so
narrowly as to limit it to the accounting field. Context matters and the Court has repeatedly
instructed that statutes should not be interpreted in a vacuum. See, e.g., Gustafson, 513 U.S. at
568 (noting that the Court must “construe statutes, not isolated provisions”).
First, in section 19, Congress delegated the power to define terms for the entire title, even
though it did not include any accounting terms other than those that appeared in section 19 and
schedules A and B. See Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 88–91 (1933). Congress’s grant of
authority to define terms extended to the entire Securities Act and was not limited to section 19 or
schedules A and B, suggesting that “technical and trade terms” should not be interpreted so
narrowly so as to apply only to matters of accounting.
Second, Congress granted the SEC the power to define terms in the Exchange Act using
similar language as found in the Securities Act. More importantly, in the Exchange Act,
Congress placed the power to define terms in section 3(b), which immediately follows the
definitional section, suggesting that the power to define was relatively broad. Finally, in 1934,
Congress amended the Securities Act by adding “technical” terms to the Commission’s power to
define, suggesting that Congress intended greater conformity between the two sections. See
Pub. L. No. 73-290, § 209(a), 48 Stat. 881, 908 (1934); see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494
U.S. 56, 76 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting a uniform reading of the Securities and
Exchange Acts); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985) (“We have
repeatedly ruled that the definitions of ‘security’ in § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the
1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope
of the term.” (citations omitted)).
153. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (“The term ‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock,
security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security,’ or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006)
(substantially similar).
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each of the twenty-plus congressionally enumerated instruments generates its
own definitional dilemma.154 Congress used numerous ambiguous terms in
compiling its list of securities, including technical and trade terms for which
the SEC’s interpretive guidance would be beneficial to the public.155 The
Commission’s authority to define terms, including any technical or trade terms
included in Congress’s own definition of “security,” suggests that Congress
intended for the SEC to have the primary role in interpreting the Commission’s
own regulatory realm.156
Congress specified rulemaking as the means by which the SEC could define
terms. 157 Accordingly, if the Commission promulgated a rule defining a
technical or trade term that Congress included in its own definition of
“security,” then courts should defer to the SEC’s definition if it is
reasonable.158 However, if the Commission speaks to an interpretation of a
term outside of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, a court should not
dismiss the SEC’s position. By empowering the Commission to define terms,
Congress indicated its preference that the Commission, rather than the courts,
define technical and trade terms used in the the Securities Acts.159 Therefore,
even when the SEC acts through methods other than rulemaking, courts should
still accord substantial weight to its interpretation because of Congress’s
preference that the Commission define such terms.160

154. LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 859 n.6 (stating that each instrument may have its own
definitional problems).
155. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686 (stating that this definition “includes both instruments
whose names alone carry well-settled meaning, as well as instruments of ‘more variable character
[that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms,’ such as ‘investment contract’ and
‘instrument commonly known as a security’” (citation omitted) (alteration in original)); see also
Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 584 (acknowledging the word “prospectus” as a “term of art”).
156. United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) (“This is the very situation in
which we look to an authoritative agency for a decision about the statute’s scope, which is
defined in cases at the statutory margin by the agency’s application of it, and once the choice is
made we ask only whether the Department’s application was reasonable.”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[T]he principle of deference to administrative
interpretations has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning
or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the
force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary
knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
157. See supra note 152.
158. Compare Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 172–74 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(according Chevron deference to a Commission rule that narrowly defined a congressional
exemption, which arguably expanded the Commission’s jurisdiction).
159. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1838, at 30 (1934) (Conf. Rep.).
160. See id. (“The substitute retains the House provisions except that it is not provided that
the definitions ‘shall have the force of law.’ This phrase was omitted as unnecessary, since
courts commonly give the force of law to administrative interpretations of statutory terms, unless
clearly inconsistent with the legislative intent.”); see also Bressman, supra note 50, at 587–88
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Counter-arguments exist, but prove unconvincing. For example, one might
point to the phrase in the Exchange Act regarding the Commission’s power to
define terms “as to matters within [its] . . . jurisdiction.”161 Although the
definition of “security” may be considered jurisdictional,162 the SEC would be
acting within its delegated powers and within its jurisdictional reach when
defining a technical or trade term that Congress used in its definition of
“security.”163
A more general argument against the Commission’s definitional authority
regarding “security” involves negative implications. For example, in the
Exchange Act, immediately after defining “security,” Congress defined “equity
security,” and, in so doing, it expressly empowered the SEC to expand the
Because Congress empowered the
definition of “equity security.” 164
Commission to expand one congressionally provided definition (“equity
security”), one arguably should give force to the absence of such
empowerment in a closely related definitional section (“security”). Even
accepting this negative-implication argument, the Commission does not
expand Congress’s definition of “security.” Instead, the Commission is
acting within its delegated power to define any technical or trade terms (or, for
the Exchange Act, “any other terms”) that appear in Congress’s definition of
“security.”165 Although the practical effect of exercising the power to define
technical or trade terms may be to expand the class of securities, the
Commission’s action would remain consistent with its congressionally
delegated powers.
Another statutory provision suggests that the courts—not the SEC—should
define what constitutes a “security.” In the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB
Act), which amended the Exchange Act, Congress empowered the
(suggesting that an agency’s considered position commands substantial weight even if not the
product of formal rulemaking).
161. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(b) (2006).
162. See supra Part I.A.
163. See Brief for Respondent at 35–36, Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 166 (No.
09-1021), available at http://sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2009/americanequitybrief0409.pdf (arguing
that the Commission is not expanding its jurisdiction by promulgating a rule that narrowly defines
an ambiguous statutory exemption).
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (“The term ‘equity security’ means any stock . . . or any
other security which the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or
appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to treat as an equity security.”). Section 3(a)(11) is not the only
definitional section that Congress empowered the Commission to adjust. See,
e.g., id. § 78c(a)(12)(A)(vii) (“The term ‘exempted security’ or ‘exempted
securities’ includes . . . such other securities . . . as the Commission may . . . exempt from the
operation of any one or more provisions of this chapter which do not apply to an ‘exempted
security’ or to ‘exempted securities’”); id. § 78c(a)(23)(B)(iii) (empowering the Commission to
expand the definition by ruling against a congressionally created exclusion); id. § 78c(a)(35)(C)
(empowering the Commission to expand upon the definition of “investment discretion”).
165. Id. § 78c(b); H.R. REP. NO. 73-1838, at 4 (1934) (Conf. Rep.).

2013]

Court Deference to the SEC

305

Commission to regulate products that it determines to be “hybrid” products.166
The GLB Act, however, also provided that the “court shall determine to affirm
and enforce or set aside a regulation of the Commission . . . , based on the
determination of the court as to whether . . . the subject
product is a security . . . .” 167 The GLB Act’s empowerment of the
judiciary to review the Commission’s definition of “security” may suggest that
Congress intended for the courts—not the SEC—to be the primary interpretive
authority. The weakness in this argument is that, although the courts may
make the final determination, 168 they could do so and still accord great
deference to the Commission’s conclusions.169 As an alternative response,
the negative-implication argument now favors deference to the SEC rather than
the courts. That is, by expressly empowering courts to make the final
determination of whether an instrument constitutes a “hybrid security,” but not
expressly empowering the courts to make the final determination of whether an
instrument constitutes a “security,” the negative-implication argument suggests
that Congress intended the Commission to be interpreter-in-chief of what
instruments constitute “securities.”170
B.

The Commission’s Exemptive Powers

Congress delegated broad powers to the SEC to exempt any security or class
of securities from any provision of the Securities Acts or from any rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder. 171 In permitting the Commission to
166. See Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 205, 113 Stat. 1338, 1391 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(3) (2006)) (“Criteria for Rulemaking.—The Commission shall not
impose a requirement under paragraph (2) of this subsection with respect to any new hybrid
product unless the Commission determines that—(A) the new hybrid product is a security; and
(B) imposing such requirement is necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the
protection of investors.”).
167. Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 205, 113 Stat. 1338, 1393 (1999) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(5)(D) (2006)).
168. Note that a court may not actually make the “final determination” because an agency’s
subsequent interpretation may control. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005) (upholding an agency’s new interpretation of statutory
ambiguity as reasonable, despite a lower court holding setting forth a different meaning of the
ambiguity when it deemed the agency’s prior interpretation of the ambiguity unreasonable).
169. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (deferring to the agency’s
definition despite the requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 706 that courts decide all questions of law); see
also Bressman, supra note 50, at 587–88 (“[Even] if the statute delegates interpretive authority to
courts, they could rely less on traditional tools of statutory construction and more on the agency’s
practical experience with the regulatory regime.”); Duffy, supra note 27, at 202 (arguing that
although the courts resolve all questions of law, some statutes confer lawmaking authority on
agencies).
170. See Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 205, 113 Stat. 1338, 1391–92 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(5)(D) (2006)) (conferring on the courts the authority to determine
if a product is a hybrid security).
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2006) (“The Commission, by rule or regulation, may
conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or
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exempt any security or class of securities, Congress required it to consider the
public interest,172 which, in turn, requires consideration of the interests of
investors as well as those seeking financing.173
Investing parties and those who are seeking financing sit on opposite sides
of the table before the money changes hands, but their post-investment
interests frequently align. Therefore, Congress entrusted the Commission to
balance each party’s competing interests in determining what federal securities
laws, if any, should apply to their negotiations and any resulting instrument.174
That Congress delegated the authority to the SEC to determine whether the
securities laws should apply to a particular instrument—for purposes of
exemption—is instructive. It suggests that the Commission, as opposed to the
courts, should wield greater influence when determining whether the securities
laws should apply to a particular instrument for purposes of defining
“security.”175
The balancing of interests of various groups of the public is a complex
undertaking and not readily appreciated by those lacking expertise.176 The
classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title or of
any rule or regulation issued under this subchapter, to the extent that such exemption is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of
investors.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (“[T]he Commission, by rule, regulation, or
order, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any
class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this
chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.”). Notably,
the Exchange Act includes a limitation on the Commission’s exemptive authority with respect to
a narrowly specified class of securities. See id. § 78mm(b). The narrowness of the limitation
suggests the broadness of the SEC’s exemptive authority.
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 78z-3 (“[T]o the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.”); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 77mm(a)(1) (same).
173. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) (“Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is
engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection
of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”).
Although there is no parallel provision in the Exchange Act, its absence does not does not
preclude the SEC’s consideration of whether the action will “promote efficiency, competition,
and capital formation,” which impacts the public and its interest, considerations set forth in the
Exchange Act. See id. § 78mm(a)(1).
174. See infra notes 175–76.
175. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (No. 843),
1946 WL 50582 (“[I]t [is] apparent from the scheme of the [1933] Act as a whole that Congress
relied primarily upon the exemption provisions, and the exercise of administrative discretion
thereunder, to avoid impractical application of the full regulatory provisions to situations in which
the burdens upon the promoter [issuer of the securities] might be thought to be disproportionate to
the need for protection of investors.”).
176. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 4 (1934) (“With such concentration of national wealth in
the form of liquid corporate securities the economic machinery of the whole country is now
affected by, and is organized primarily to serve, security markets which are as sensitive as a hair
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Chevron Court indicated that deference to the administering agency is
appropriate when the agency can act as the expert.177 In discussing the
importance of expertise when determining a statute’s reach, the Chevron Court
suggested the appropriateness of deference to an agency regarding
jurisdictional matters.178
However, some scholars may argue that the power to exclude, or exempt an
instrument, neither encompasses nor necessitates the power to include, or treat
an instrument as a “security.” Arguably, courts need not accord any
deference to the Commission’s determination that an instrument is a
“security,” 179 particularly because the SEC is more generous than
parsimonious in making this determination.180 Perhaps Congress trusts the
Commission when the Commission determines that the balance tips in one
direction (exemption), but does not trust the Commission’s determination that
the balance tips in the opposite direction (inclusion).
In response, Congress did not limit the SEC’s broad exemptive powers to
securities or classes of securities. 181 The Commission can couple its
treatment of an instrument as a “security” with exemptive relief from
provisions of the federal securities laws if such laws are redundant or
otherwise unnecessary. For example, after defining an instrument as a
“security,” the SEC could exempt that security from burdensome obligations
such as disclosure requirements or liability provisions. 182 Congressional
delegation of such broad exemptive powers suggests that court deference to the
SEC is appropriate whether the Commission favors an instrument’s treatment
as a “security” or not.183

trigger.”); see also Karmel, supra note 12, at 35 (“The articulation of new standards is a difficult
business, especially in a dynamic and fast paced area like securities regulation.”).
177. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
178. Id. at 844 (“[T]he principle of deterrence to administrative interpretations has been
consistently followed by this Court whenever the decision as to the reach of a statute has involved
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters
subjected to agency regulations.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
179. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693–94 (1985).
180. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 1209 (suggesting that the Commission “contends for
a liberal application of this definition [of ‘security’]”).
181. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-3, 78mm(a)(1) (2006); see also S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 14 (1934)
(“Thus the Commission is able to remove from the operation of any one or more of these
provisions any securities as to which it deems such provisions inappropriate. It may attach such
conditions to such exemptions as it deems desirable.”).
182. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1582–84 (2006) (proposing that the
Commission exempt non-trading corporations from class action liability under Rule 10b-5).
183. See Bressman, supra note 50, at 584 (stating that a court should rarely conclude that an
agency overstepped its authority).
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Congress’s Context Clause

In the Securities Acts, Congress provided that, “unless the context otherwise
requires . . . the term ‘security’ means any note, stock,
treasury stock . . . .”184 By including this “context clause,” Congress clearly
delegated an interpretive power with respect to its definition of “security.”
Congress did not, however, indicate clearly whether the power should be
exercised by the courts, the SEC, or both. Two theories have emerged as to
the meaning of the context clause. According to the first theory, “context”
means the appearance of the term “security” elsewhere in the federal securities
laws. 185 According to the second theory, “context” means the factual
circumstances of the transaction being scrutinized.186 Statutory clues and
Court precedent lend support to both theories.
1.

Context from Surrounding Sections

Congress could have intended “context” to refer to other portions of the
federal securities laws. Such usage would reflect the common definition of
“context” as “the parts of a discourse that surround a word or passage and can
throw light on its meaning.”187 The Court has endorsed the interpretation that
the context clause is Congress’s way of cautioning that the same word may
take on different meanings within different provisions of the federal securities
laws.188
The context clause does not just modify the definition of “security;” it
modifies every term Congress set forth in its definitional section. In the
Securities Act, the context clause precedes more than fifteen terms; and in the
Exchange Act, the context clause precedes more than sixty terms.189 Because
there are numerous terms that could take on different definitions depending on
the provisions in which they appear, the statute’s construction favors the
184. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006)
(emphasis added).
185. See infra notes 188–91 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 192–206 and accompanying text.
187. WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 250 (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S].
188. See SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (“Congress itself has cautioned
that the same words may take on a different coloration in different sections of the securities laws;
both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts preface their lists of general definitions with the phrase ‘unless
the context otherwise requires.’” (citations omitted)); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S.
561, 588–89 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Despite the majority’s protestations, it is
absolutely clear that the 1933 Act uses ‘prospectus’ in two different ways. . . . [T]his
understanding is reinforced by § 2’s preface that its definitions apply ‘unless the context
otherwise requires.’ This phrase indicates that Congress intended simply to provide a ‘default’
meaning for ‘prospectus.’” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b)); id. at 598 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“According ‘prospectus’ discrete meanings in § 10 and § 12(2) is consistent with Congress’
specific instruction in § 2 that definitions apply ‘unless the context otherwise requires.’” (citing
15 U.S.C. § 77b)).
189. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(16), 78c(a)(64).
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argument that Congress intended an expert to interpret those terms.190 In this
regard, the context clause could represent congressional delegation to the
Commission, empowering it to adjust Congress’s definition to capture or
exclude a particular instrument as a “security.” Moreover, the context clause
was unnecessary to empower the courts to deviate from statutory language,191
so its inclusion may have been intended to empower the SEC.
2.

Context from Factual Circumstances

Alternatively, Congress could have intended the context clause to mean the
factual circumstances surrounding the particular transaction under scrutiny.
“Context” also means: “[T]he interrelated conditions in which something exists
or occurs: ENVIRONMENT, SETTING.”192 The legislative history of the
context clause supports this meaning as well. 193 An early draft of the
Securities Act preceded the definitional section with the language “unless the
text otherwise indicates.” 194 By rejecting the proposed text clause and
enacting the context clause, Congress seemingly favored considerations of
factual circumstances beyond just the text of the statute.
This interpretation of the context clause finds support in several of the
Court’s decisions regarding the existence of a “security.” In Marine Bank v.
Weaver, the Court specifically referenced the transactional nature of the
inquiry and the importance of “the factual setting.”195 The Court emphasized
the factual context of the transaction in question by highlighting its uniqueness

190. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 688 (1985) (“[T]he reach of the
Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943))); see also Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 856 (1984) (discussing the EPA’s usage of two definitions for a
single term and arguing for “a flexible rather than a rigid definition of the term ‘source’ to
implement various policies and programs”).
191. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a
familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted,
and the reports are full of cases illustrating its application.”).
192. WEBSTER’S, supra note 187, at 250; see also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551,
558–59 (1982).
193. Reliance on legislative history can be fraught with peril. See WILLIAM E. ESKRIDGE,
JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 948–49 (3d ed. 2002) (“Lobbyists and
lawyers maneuver endlessly to persuade staff members (who write the committee reports) or their
legislative bosses to throw in helpful language in the reports when insertion of similar language
would be inappropriate or infeasible for the statute itself.”); see also Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 195, 214 (1983) (describing citations to legislative history as “looking over a crowd and
picking out your friends” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Honorable Harold
Leventhal)).
194. S. 875, 73d Cong. § 2 (1933); H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. § 2 (1933) (emphasis added); LOSS
ET AL., supra note 32, at 862 & n.15.
195. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560 n.11.
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in determining that the instrument was not a “security.”196 Additionally, the
Court noted that, given the surrounding circumstances, the transaction would
be subject to federal regulation even if the federal securities laws were
inapplicable.197 In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Court similarly emphasized
the factual context of the transaction by contrasting a corporate note to finance
an enterprise, which would be a “security,” with an individual’s home
mortgage note, which would not be a “security,” concluding that, when
Congress wrote “any note,” it did not literally mean “any note.”198
If the context clause refers to the factual circumstances of the transaction
under scrutiny, then Congress may have intended for the courts to determine
whether the context otherwise requires that the definition of “security” be
altered to include or exclude the instrument. Arguably, the Commission
should adopt broadly applicable rules instead of formulating policy via
individual enforcement actions and their unique factual circumstances. 199

196. Id. at 560 (finding that “[t]he provision that the Weavers could use the barn and pastures
of the slaughterhouse at the discretion of the Piccirillos underscores the unique character of the
transaction. . . . Accordingly, we hold that this unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the
parties, is not a security.” (footnote omitted)). The court emphasized that “[e]ach transaction
must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the
purposes intended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole.” Id. at 560 n.11.
197. See id. at 558–59 (“The definition of ‘security’ in the 1934 Act provides that an
instrument which seems to fall within the broad sweep of the Act is not to be considered a
security if the context otherwise requires. It is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates
of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders
of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under the federal banking laws.”). The
Court’s emphasis on alternative regulatory schemes has been criticized. First, the protections
provided by the federal securities laws generally are cumulative of other legal protections. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2006) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the rights and
remedies provided by this subchapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies
that may exist at law or in equity.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006) (virtually identical). Second,
the Court first referred to an alternative regulatory scheme as additional support for a conclusion
already reached. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569 (1978) (“If any
further evidence were needed . . . the enactment of ERISA in 1974 . . . would put the matter to
rest.”); see also Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition
of “Security”: The “Context” Clause, “Investment Contract” Analysis, and Their Ramifications,
40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 505–06 (1987) (criticizing the Court’s analysis that considers an
alternative regulatory scheme sufficient to render the federal securities laws inapplicable). In
Weaver, an alternative regulatory scheme grew in importance for the Court’s analysis. See
Weaver, 455 U.S. at 502.
198. See 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990) (stating that “the phrase ‘any note’ should not be interpreted
literally as ‘any note’”); see also Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 (1985)
(“‘[N]ote’ may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with
widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as
commercial paper, or in some other investment context.”).
199. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 41 (“As a Commissioner, I was . . . opposed to both
substantive and procedural jurisdictional expansionism through enforcement prosecutions.”); see
also Stephenson, supra note 49, at 1060 (“[F]or statutes that require application of general
standards to the facts of particular cases on a more individualized basis—for example, antifraud
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Because courts speak only to individual cases, a court necessarily focuses on
the factual circumstances in which those cases arise.200 Thus, a court would
defer to the content of the agency’s rules, but would not defer to an agency’s
unadorned application of rules to those facts.201
The question arises, if the context clause was an implicit delegation of
interpretive power by Congress to the SEC, then why did Congress—within
certain defined terms preceded by the context clause—expressly empower the
Commission to alter those definitions? 202 Some scholars argue that the
inclusion of implicit and explicit power is mere redundancy. In contrast,
laws . . . —legislators would tend to favor delegation to courts because such statutes implicate a
larger number of discrete interpretive issues of roughly comparable importance.”).
200. See United Hous. Found. Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (“The task has fallen
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the body charged with administering the
Securities Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide which of the myriad financial
transactions in our society come within the coverage of these statutes.” (emphasis added)). That
a court decides only one case at a time may be an oversimplification. Because of stare decisis,
individual court decisions commonly serve as long-lasting rules. A court may be hesitant to
reverse its interpretation of a statute because it may expect the legislature to fix any interpretive
error. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 193, app. B, at 20 (“CONTINUITY
IN LAW: . . . Super-strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents.”); see also Scalia,
supra note 58, at 517 (“One of the major disadvantages of having the courts resolve ambiguities
is that they resolve them for ever and ever; only statutory amendment can produce a change.”).
However, a strength of the argument for delegation to courts is the courts’ temporal consistency
(stare decisis), which enhances third parties’ understanding and compliance. Arguably, this may
hinder the development of the law necessary to capture new instruments designed to evade
existing regulation. See Peters, supra note 78, at 292 (“[I]t is virtually axiomatic that the market
will try to overcome any cabining regulation.”). Thus, regulatory flexibility is required.
201. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
When an agency’s own rule is ambiguous, courts routinely defer to the agency’s interpretation of
that ambiguity. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); see also Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
202. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (2006) (“When used in this chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires—The term ‘equity security’ means any stock . . . or any other security which
the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by such
rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to
treat as an equity security.”); id. § 78c(a)(12)(A)(vii) (“When used in this chapter, unless the
context
otherwise
requires—The
term
‘exempted
security’
or
‘exempted
securities’ includes . . . such other securities . . . as the Commission may . . . exempt from the
operation of any one or more provisions of this chapter which do not apply to an ‘exempted
security’ or to ‘exempted securities’”).
A response to this belief is that Congress routinely has employed a belts-and-suspenders
approach to the federal securities laws. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
383 (1983) (“[I]t is hardly a novel proposition that the [1933 and 1934 Acts] prohibit some of the
same conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also SEC v. Nat’l Secs., Inc. 393 U.S.
453, 468 (1969) (“The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual nor
unfortunate.”). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78mm (2006) (providing the Commission with general
exemptive authority), with 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12)(A)(vii) (2006) (providing the Commission with
particularized exemptive authority), and 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(2) (2006) (also providing the
Commission with particularized exemptive authority). Consequently, arguments of negative
implication may lack their typical force.
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some justices have interpreted the context clause as a delegation to the
courts.203
Perhaps this theory asks the context clause to bear more weight than it can
withstand. If there was no context clause, courts would look to the factual
context.204 Therefore, according such a meaning to the context clause may be
amiss, particularly when courts decide only one case at a time and necessarily
focus on its factual setting or context. Moreover, if the context clause serves
as a delegation to the courts, the courts “could rely less on traditional tools of
statutory construction and more on the agency’s practical experience with the
regulatory regime.”205 Given that policy considerations play a significant role
in defining “security,” greater reliance by a court on the administering agency
seems particularly appropriate.206
D.

Congress’s Overlapping and Circular Definition

In section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange
Act, Congress defined “security” broadly, setting forth a number of financial
instruments.207 In deciding whether an instrument constitutes a “security,”
the Court has determined that those congressionally enumerated instruments

203. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 75–76 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he exclusion for short-term
notes must be read in light of the prefatory language in § 2 of the 1933 Act and § 3 of the 1934
Act. . . . The context clause thus permits a judicial construction of the statute which harmonizes
the facially rigid terms of the 9-month exclusion with the evident intent of Congress.” (emphasis
added)); see also id. at 81 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“leaves it to the judiciary to flesh out
additional ‘context clause’ exceptions”); Exch. Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126,
1138 (2d Cir. 1976) (“So long as the statutes remain as they have been for over forty years, courts
had better not depart from their words without strong support for the conviction that, under the
authority vested in them by the ‘context’ clause, they are doing what Congress wanted when they
refuse to do what is said.” (emphasis added)).
204. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 860 (describing the context clause as an “explicit
reminder of a doctrine of statutory construction that should be implicit in any event”).
205. Bressman, supra note 50, at 587–88.
206. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 n.7 (1985) (“[I]t is proper for a
court to consider—as we do today—policy considerations in construing terms in these Acts.”);
see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008)
(“Overseas firms with no other exposure to our securities laws could be deterred from doing
business here. This, in turn, may raise the cost of being a publicly traded company under our law
and shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets.” (citations omitted)); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (weighing policy considerations in
reaching its conclusion); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 345 (1967) (“Policy considerations
lead us to conclude that the petitioners are entitled to the investor protections afforded by the
Securities Exchange Act.”).
207. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2006); see also Reves, 494 U.S. at 61 (“Congress
therefore did not attempt precisely to cabin the scope of the Securities Acts.” (footnote
omitted)); Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 338 (“Even a casual reading of § 3(a)(10) of the
1934 Act reveals that Congress did not intend to adopt a narrow or restrictive concept of security
in defining that term.”); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933); LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at
858–59 n.6.
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substantially overlap.208 In Tcherepnin v. Knight, the Court determined that
the instruments in question constituted securities because they were
“investment contract[s],” “certificate[s] of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement,” “stock,” and “transferable share[s].”209 In SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., the Court indicated that the instruments constituted
both “investment contract[s]” and “instrument[s] commonly known as
securit[ies].” 210 Congress’s overlapping of definitional terms invites and
enhances an agency’s discretion to regulate.211 Further, Congress defined
“security” by using the term “security,”212 a circular logic that amounts to a
delegation of interpretive authority, prompting the Court to defer to the
agency’s interpretation.213
III. NON-DEFERENCE AND ITS IMPACT
In cases of statutory ambiguity,214 either a court or the relevant agency will
provide clarity. Between the two, the agency possesses greater subject matter
expertise, better appreciates the conflicting policies implicated by the
ambiguity, and better understands the consequences that follow alternative

208. See Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 339 (“But we need not rest our decision on that conclusion
[that the instrument constitutes an ‘investment contract’] alone. . . . The petitioners’ shares fit well
within several other descriptive terms contained in § 3(a)(10).”); see also SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (“Instruments may be included within any of these
definitions, as matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or description.”).
Although the Court later disclaimed the argument that the Howey test for “investment contracts”
was the lone test for determining the existence of a “security,” the Forman Court stated that the
Howey test “embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court’s decisions
defining a security.” United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); see also
Gordon, supra note 44, at 403 (charting the similarities between the Court’s “investment
contract” inquiry and its “note” inquiry). Additionally, the Forman Court “perceive[d] no
distinction . . . between an ‘investment contract’ and an ‘instrument commonly known as a
‘security.’” Forman, 421 U.S. at 852; see also LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 863 n.19 (“There
has been surprisingly little judicial or administrative construction of the phrase [‘any interest or
instrument commonly known as a “security”’], perhaps because other phrases, especially
investment contract, normally satisfy any reasonable plaintiff.”).
209. See Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 339.
210. See Joiner, 320 U.S. at 351.
211. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984) (“[I]t would appear that
the listing of overlapping, illustrative terms was intended to enlarge, rather than to confine, the
scope of the agency’s power to regulate particular sources in order to effectuate the policies of the
Act.”).
212. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2006) (“The term ‘security’ means . . . any interest
or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’ . . . .”).
213. See Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 12–18
(2004) (according Skidmore deference to an agency’s interpretation of Congress’s circular
definition); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–49
(2003) (same).
214. To reiterate, if a statute is unambiguous, Congress left no interpretive gap for the agency
to fill so Congress’s clear intent must be enforced. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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resolutions of the ambiguity.215 Consequently, when a court deviates from
the agency’s interpretation, an inferior outcome is more likely to result than if
the court had deferred to the agency’s interpretation.216 In some cases, by
failing to defer to the SEC’s expertise, the Supreme Court has unnecessarily
addressed issues and then resolved them incorrectly. Such judicial action has
generated confusion among the lower courts and has required, or will require,
redressing by the Supreme Court.
A.

United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman

When United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman was decided, the Court
acknowledged that deference to agency interpretations was the norm. 217
Nevertheless, the Forman Court did not defer to the SEC’s position.218 In
Forman, the Court addressed whether the instruments acquired by tenants of
the issuer constituted “investment contracts” and were thus considered
securities.219 As set forth by the Court, the test was “whether the scheme
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others.”220 Under this test, the Court must consider
the definition of “profits” and whose “efforts” generated those profits.

215. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“[T]he principle of deference to administrative
interpretations has been consistently followed by this Court whenever . . . a full understanding of
the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary
knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.” (citations omitted) (internal
quotations marks omitted)). The Court also emphasized that “[j]udges are not experts in the
field . . . .” Id. at 865; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001)
(“Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit
some deference . . . , given the specialized experience and broader investigations and information
available to the agency . . . .” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
216. See Brief for Petitioner at 30, 37–38, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (No.
843), 1946 WL 50582 (criticizing the lower court’s inquiry as “administratively impractical,” and
arguing that “the consequence is to afford loopholes for those who may desire to evade the Act”
and the inquiry “invite[s] extended litigation in those cases where the form of the security is novel
and differs from more orthodox types in general use”); see also Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note
197, at 492, 529 (arguing that “Weaver serves as a compelling focus for an even more serious
problem: The Supreme Court’s apparent inability to comprehend thoroughly and to address
analytically, consistently with the language, legislative history, and underlying policies of the
securities acts, the important issues of federal securities regulation” and further asserting that
Weaver “is an example of judicial activism at its worst”).
217. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 n.25 (1975) (“Traditionally
the views of an agency charged with administering the governing statute would be entitled to
considerable weight.” (citations omitted)).
218. See id. at 849–58.
219. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2006) (“The term ‘security’ means
any . . . investment contract . . . .”); see also Forman, 421 U.S. at 840.
220. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. 301) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Rejecting the Commission’s Position Regarding “Profits”

The Court determined that consumption does not constitute an investment,
which would prohibit treatment of the instrument as an “investment
contract.”221 The Court concluded that, in this case, “there can be no doubt
that investors were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live,
and not by financial returns on their investment.”222 Therefore, according to
the Court, the individuals were consuming, not investing for profit.223 Next,
the Court launched into a discussion regarding the concept of “profits,”
according no deference to the Commission’s longstanding position.224 The
Court narrowly construed “profits” as “either capital appreciation . . . or a
participation in earnings . . . .”225 By contrast, the SEC had recognized that a
financial opportunity may involve both aspects of consumption and investment
for profit.226 To conclude that the transaction constituted an “investment
contract,” the Commission required only that the investment aspect
predominate, not that the consumptive aspect be absent.227 By not deferring
to the Commission’s interpretation and instead favoring an overly cramped
definition of profits, the Court easily emphasized the exclusivity of
consumption and the total absence of investment.228
The facts of Forman indicate that the individuals had to purchase the
instruments in question in order to gain access to housing.229 The purchasers
of the instruments, who were of modest means,230 would not tie up their
limited resources to acquire access to just any apartment, particularly when
apartments could be obtained without purchasing such instruments. 231
221. Id. at 852–53 (reasoning that purchasers who consume are not seeking a profit from
their financial contribution); see also Gordon, supra note 44, at 396.
222. Forman, 421 U.S. at 853 (emphasis added).
223. Nevertheless, interestingly and confusingly, the Court continually referred to the tenants
as “investors.” See generally Forman, 421 U.S. 387.
224. See id. at 851–53.
225. Id. at 852.
226. See In re Natural Res. Corp., 8 SEC 635 (1941); see also Guidelines as to the
Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a
Real Estate Development, Securities Act Release No. 5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735, 1735–36 (Jan. 4,
1973).
227. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 28 (5th
ed. 2006) (“Investment Versus Consumption”); see also LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 942
(“weighing of the purposes of an investment”).
228. Forman, 421 U.S. at 853 & n.17 (“In some transactions the investor is offered both a
commodity or real estate for use and an expectation of profits. . . . The application of the federal
securities laws to these transactions may raise difficult questions that are not present in this
case.”).
229. Id. at 842 (describing the requirement of share purchases to obtain housing).
230. Id. at 841 (“wage earners and other persons of low or moderate income”).
231. See id. at 842–43, 856 (highlighting the difficulty for the tenant to “sell [the instrument]
for more than the initial purchase price” and noting that “income—if indeed there is any—is far
too speculative and insubstantial”).
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Instead, the individuals purchased the instruments to obtain housing at a deep
discount relative to market rates for comparable housing232—essentially to
obtain an economic profit. The Court’s cramped conception of “profits,”
including only capital appreciation and dividends that were impossible and
unlikely, accorded no deference to the SEC’s conception of “profits.”233 The
Court faulted the Commission’s position that the individuals had an
expectation of profits attributable, in part, to “savings based on the fact that
apartments [offered by the seller of the instruments] . . . cost substantially less
than comparable nonsubsidized housing.”234 The Court stated, “this [was] an
inappropriate theory of ‘profits’ that [it] could not accept.”235 The Court’s
interpretation runs contrary not only to its overarching instruction to “examine
. . . the economic realities of the transaction,”236 but also to the longstanding
position of the Commission to focus on substance over form. 237 When
focusing on substance, one should not distinguish between a dollar earned and
a dollar saved. Attempting that distinction offends not only economics, but
also common sense.238 For one to have “zero profit” would indicate that one
rents the same quality apartment at the same rate as others.239 In Forman, the
232. See Forman v. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1124 n.27 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(“Relatively speaking, Co-op City still offers one of the lowest rent structures of any
Mitchell-Lama housing in New York City.”). Perhaps unlike other comparably priced housing,
the offered housing presented a “favorable environment for family . . . community
atmosphere . . . [and] very little turnover.” Forman, 421 U.S. at 854 (quoting the Information
Bulletin in App. 162a, 166a of the District Court’s record).
233. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 858–59 n.25.
234. Id. at 846.
235. Id. at 855.
236. Id. at 851; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (“Form was
disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon economic reality.”).
237. See Brief of Petitioner at 12, Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (No. 843), 1946 WL 50582 (“[T]he
substance controls the form . . . .”); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 16 n.20, Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (No. 74-157) (“Thus, Howey cannot be read to
require a literal monetary ‘profit’ . . . .”).
238. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 863–64 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Court must
surprise knowledgeable economists with its proposition . . . that profits cannot assume forms
other than appreciation of capital or participation in earnings,” adding that “[n]ot only would
simple common sense teach that [money saved and money earned] are the same, but a more
sophisticated economic analysis also compels the conclusion that in a practical world there is no
difference between the two forms of income.”); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral
Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1499, 1503 (1998) (“There is also a large body of work that suggests that whether
decisions are ‘framed’ in terms of potential gains or losses affects decisions even though the
framing may be completely arbitrary and manipulable.”).
239. See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1218 (2008) (“‘Economic profits’ measures how profitable a company is
relative to other ways of investing one’s money. Thus, ‘zero economic profits’ does not mean that
firms are not making money, but rather that all firms are doing as well as the rest of the market.”);
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (6th ed. 2003) (“A profit
opportunity is a magnet drawing resources into an activity.”).
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purchasers of the instruments fared better than their peers who sought housing
without purchasing the instruments in question; those who purchased the
instruments profited. 240 In formal adjudications and other interpretive
guidance, the SEC construed “profits” more broadly than the Forman Court;
the Commission’s construction should have commanded the Court’s
deference.241
The Court attempted to respond to this line of thought, stating: “There is no
doubt that purchasers in this housing cooperative sought to obtain a decent
home at an attractive price. But that type of economic interest characterizes
every form of commercial dealing.”242 The Court was correct but presented a
non sequitur. The regularity with which people seek profit in a transaction
does not speak to the presence or absence of a “security;” misplaced is any
concern that every transaction will result in the creation of a “security.” The
quest for profit does not mean that one’s expectation of profit is reasonable.243

This Article refers to “economic profit” to suggest that the Court’s definition of profits was
overly narrow, not to suggest its adoption by the Court. “Economic profit” may be an overly
narrow term in and of itself. See, e.g., Forman v. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1131
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (objecting to a definition of “profit” confined to “economic profit,” which could
yield an inquiry into an “uncharted and unchartable realm of intangible, elusive personal values”).
240. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006) (requiring the disgorgement of profits whether in the
form of gains or losses avoided); see also Forman, 421 U.S. at 863–64 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Forman, 366 F. Supp. at 1129 n.36 (“[It avoids the problems of private apartment dwelling]
where the landlord’s interest was financial gain . . . .” (first alteration in original) (quoting
Offering Bulletin)).
241. See In re Abbett, Sommer & Co., Inc., 44 SEC 104, 109 (1969) (“We do not consider it
significant that in the ‘investment contract’ cases previously cited the services were designed to
create a profit, whereas in the present case the services were directed essentially toward
minimizing the risk involved in the investment.”); see also Guidelines as to the Applicability of
the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate
Development, Securities Act Release No. 5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973) (“The ‘profits’
that the purchaser is led to expect may consist of revenues received from rental of the unit . . . and
any tax benefits resulting from rental of the unit . . . .”); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 15, 16 n.20, Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (No. 74-157) (arguing that
“[c]ontrary to petitioners’ contention that ‘profit’ in some narrow accounting sense is required”
and concluding, “[t]hus, Howey cannot be read to require a literal monetary ‘profit’”).
242. Forman, 421 U.S. at 858. The Court also referenced welfare benefits and food stamps.
See id. at 855. Although welfare benefits and food stamps may yield profit, consumption
dominates investment. The Court also tried to liken the instruments’ purchase price to a
recoverable deposit. See id. at 842 (stating that “[t]he sole purpose of acquiring these shares is
to enable the purchaser to occupy an apartment in Co-op City; in effect, their purchase is a
recoverable deposit on an apartment” and emphasizing the non-profit character of the endeavor).
The Court, however, gave no indication that, upon a tenant’s departure, the instruments’ sales
price would be reduced for nonpayment of rent or damage to the apartment; and neither did the
lower courts. The Court’s characterization of the purchase as a deposit does not reflect the
economic realities of the transaction.
243. See id. at 852 (“reasonable expectations of profits” (emphasis added)).
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Moreover, as in Forman, in any mixed-motives transaction, consumption
frequently dominates investment.244
The Forman Court overstated its position and need not have charted such an
extreme course. Having failed to defer to the Commission,245 the Court
issued an opinion that gave rise to confusion and required clarification. In
subsequent cases, the Court refined, if not repudiated, its limited definition of
“profits” set forth in Forman.246 Today, the Court’s position more closely
resembles that of the SEC. Had the Forman Court deferred to the
Commission in that case, it would have alleviated the need for further
clarification.
Given the Commission’s power to define “investment
contract,”247 the Commission’s guidance regarding an element thereof should
have commanded deference.248 Giving force to long-held positions of the
Commission enhances continuity of the law and allows private actors to plan
244. See id. at 864–65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 16, Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (No. 74-157) (“Nor does the fact that investors directly enjoy the housing to which
their stock entitles them diminish the investment character of the transaction.”); see also id. at 15
(“Contrary to petitioners’ contention that ‘profit’ in some narrow accounting
sense is required . . .”).
Moreover, the Supreme Court deviated from its own precedent. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
the purchasers of the disputed instruments were consumers, having acquired title to land. 328
U.S. 293, 295 (1946) (“Upon full payment of the purchase price the land is conveyed to the
purchaser by warranty deed.”). The Howey Court, however, made clear that, although an
individual could be both an investor and a consumer, one may dominate the other and in this
instance, the investor dominated the consumer. See id. at 299 (stating that “[t]he respondent
companies are offering something more than fee simple interests in land”).
246. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 396 (2004) (“Concededly, Forman’s illustrative
description of prior decisions on ‘profits’ appears to have been mistaken for
an exclusive list . . . . [W]e will not bind ourselves unnecessarily to passing dictum . . . .”); see
also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 58 n.4 (1990) (“We have, of
course, defined ‘profit’ . . . restrictively . . . . To apply this restrictive definition to the
determination whether an instrument is a ‘note’ would be to suggest that notes paying a rate of
interest not keyed to the earnings of the enterprise are not ‘notes’ with the meaning of the
Securities Acts.” (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 852)).
247. See supra Part II.A.
248. Although courts should defer generally to such definitional positions advocated by the
Commission, such deference should not be equated with blind deference. The Commission
supported treatment of the instruments in Forman as “securities;” and the Court was correct to
reject the Commission’s ultimate conclusion. Contrary to its position in Forman, the
Commission generally treated the acquisition of a principal residence as consumption and thus
not an “investment contract.” See Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities
Laws to Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Securities
Act Release No. 5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735, 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973) (distinguishing the acquisition of
real estate as such from condominium units coupled with rental pool arrangements). Under the
Howey test, if one element is not met, then the instrument is not an “investment contract.” See
Gordon, supra note 44, at 396. The Court could have deferred to the Commission’s guidance
regarding “profits” and accorded weight to the Commission’s consistent long-standing positions,
and still rejected any position adopted for the first time during the litigation of the case. See
Bressman, supra note 50, at 581.
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their transactions in accordance with law.249 Moreover, if the SEC maintains
its positions for long periods of time, and neither the President nor Congress
act to countermand those positions, then the Commission’s positions command
respect as having withstood the scrutiny of the most politically accountable
actors.250
2. Rejecting the Commission’s Position Regarding “From the Efforts of
Others”
The Forman Court need not have continued its analysis once it concluded
that individual purchasers were consuming, not investing, and that there could
not be an “investment contract,” but the Court unfortunately continued its
flawed analysis. The Court reiterated that, in an investment contract, profit
must flow “solely from the efforts of others,”251 despite reticence by the
Commission and the lower courts to strictly apply the “solely” requirement,252
and despite the fact that the “solely” requirement was dictum.253 Moreover,
the “solely” requirement emphasized form over substance because of the ease
with which one could circumvent the requirement. Such emphasis on form
over substance is inconsistent with the Court’s instruction to focus on the
economic realities of the transaction.254 To its credit, the Court included a
footnote and referenced the SEC’s reticence, perhaps suggesting that, in the
future, it too would relax its position regarding the “solely” requirement.255
Nevertheless, “Forman’s mixed signals on ‘solely’ confused rather than
clarified the issue . . . .”256
Accordingly, the Court revisited the matter in Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth.
Although the Landreth Court addressed a congressionally
enumerated instrument (“stock”) rather than the “investment contract”
addressed by the Forman Court, the Court relaxed its earlier view on the
249. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1489 (2005).
250. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 383 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“What goes along with the jurisdiction is the responsibility . . . .”); see
also Bressman, supra note 50, at 555 (“Congress also likely delegates under conditions that
minimize princip[al]-agent concerns. . . . [Congress] can rely on a position that the agency has
long maintained in the past . . . .”).
251. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946)).
252. See Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales
of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, 38 Fed. Reg. at 1735 (“Recent
interpretations have indicated that the expected return need not be solely from the efforts of
others, as the holding in Howey appears to indicate. For this reason, an investment contract may
be present in situations where an investor is not wholly inactive, but even participates to a limited
degree in the operations of the business.” (footnote omitted)).
253. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 998 (discussing the Howey decision).
254. See id. at 950.
255. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 n.16.
256. COX ET AL., supra note 227, at 41.
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“solely” requirement.257 In so doing, the Court’s position now resembles the
SEC’s longstanding position.258
Because the Forman Court was unwilling to reconsider its articulation of the
“solely” requirement, it was determined to conclude that any economic gain
enjoyed by the purchasers was not attributable to the efforts of others.259 The
reduced rent, which the Commission believed amounted to “profit” and to
which the Court did not defer, was directly attributable to the subsidies
obtained through the efforts of those working for the issuer. 260 The
individuals who purchased the instruments did nothing to obtain the subsidies
and, based upon the Commission’s long-standing position, it is the purchaser’s
own efforts that defeat classifying an instrument as an “investment contract,”
and thus a “security.”261
257. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985)
(“We cannot agree . . . that the Acts were intended to cover only ‘passive investors’ . . . .”); see
also LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 956–57.
258. See Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales
of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Securities Act Release No. 5347, 38
Fed.
Reg.
1735,
1735
(Jan.
18,
1973)
(“[S]ubstance
should
not
be
disregarded for form . . . . Recent interpretations have indicated that the expected return need not
be solely from the efforts of others, as the holding in Howey appears to indicate.”); see also SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481–82 (9th Cir. 1973); Multi-Level
Distributorships and Pyramid Sales Plans, Securities Act Release No. 5211, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,289,
23,290 (Dec. 8, 1971) (“[I]n the Commission’s view a failure to consider the kind and degree of
efforts required of the investors ignores the equally significant teachings of Howey
that form is to be disregarded for substance . . . . The ‘efforts of others’ referred to in
Howey are limited, therefore, to those types of essential managerial efforts but for which the
anticipated return could not be produced.”).
259. Forman, 421 U.S. at 855 (“The low rent . . . does [not] result from the managerial
efforts of others.”).
260. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4 n.5, Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (No. 74-157) (“[A] limited profit housing company . . . is entitled to borrow up to
95 percent of the cost of a housing project at low interest from the state or a municipality.”).
Interestingly, then Solicitor General Robert Bork, Associate General Counsel for the SEC Paul
Gonson, and Assistant to the Solicitor General Robert Reich contributed to the government’s
brief. See id. at 24.
261. See Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d at 482 (accepting the Commission’s
position and holding that the instrument constituted a “security” even though the investor must
exert some effort to realize a return on the investment, because the efforts made other than by the
investor were undeniably the essential managerial efforts); see also Multi-Level Distributorships
and Pyramid Sales Plans, 36 Fed. Reg. at 23,390 (“[I]n the Commission’s view a security is
offered or sold where the franchisee is not required to make significant efforts in the operation of
the franchise in order to obtain the promised return.”); LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 950 (“A
more appropriate standard would require proof only that the efforts made by those other than the
investor are the undeniably significant ones . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Although not addressed by the Forman Court, the timing of the promoter’s entrepreneurial
efforts relative to the time of the purchase of the instruments may be critical. See COX ET AL.,
supra note 227, at 43–45. If the efforts that lead to profits were expended in advance of the
purchase of the instruments, then the instrument may not be a “security.” See SEC v. Life
Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 545–48 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between pre- and
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Further, in interpreting the phrase “solely the efforts of others,” the SEC
advocated a position vastly different than the Court’s conclusion.262 Giving
force to long-held positions of the Commission enhances continuity of the law
and the political accountability with respect to those positions.263
B.

Reves v. Ernst & Young

In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Court, without mentioning Chevron, set forth
the inquiry for whether an instrument constitutes a “note,” thus qualifying as a
“security.” 264 In Forman, the Court had suggested that its test for
“investment contracts” “embodies the essential attributes that run through all
of the Court’s decisions defining a security.”265 The Reves Court, however,
admitted to overstating its position. In Reves, the Court indicated that, to
interpret the test for “investment contracts” as the ultimate test for “security,”
would render as surplusage the other twenty-plus congressionally enumerated
terms in the statutory definition of “security.”266 The Court concluded that a
different test was appropriate to determine whether an instrument was a
“note.”267
At the time Reves was decided, different tests were percolating in the lower
courts. The Reves Court discussed those tests and anointed its preference, the
post-purchase entrepreneurial efforts by the promoter). In Forman, the entrepreneurial efforts
that yielded the profits sought by the purchasers were seemingly expended in advance of the
purchase of the instruments, which could prevent treatment of the instruments as “investment
contracts.” The Forman Court, however, did not discuss or foreshadow this issue and, contrary
to the conclusions of the Forman Court, the benefits enjoyed by the purchasers of the instruments
were attributable to the efforts of others.
262. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4 n.5, Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (No. 74-157) (“[A] limited profit housing company . . . is entitled to borrow up to
95 percent of the cost of a housing project at low interest from the state or a municipality.”); see
also id. at 10 (captioning the issue, without reference to “solely,” as whether the individuals
“entrusted their capital to the management of others”).
263. See Bressman, supra note 50, at 555 (“[Congress] can rely on a position that the agency
has long maintained in the past . . . .”); see also Bressman, supra note 249, at 1489.
264. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2006) (“The term ‘security’
means any note . . . .”). This Article does not address the Court’s analysis of the proviso to
section 3(a)(10). 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (“The term ‘security’ . . . shall not include . . . any note
. . . which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months . . . .”). Though
one may be sympathetic to the arguments of Justice Stevens, arguably, if the Court had applied
Chevron, the clear language of the proviso might yield a disposition of the case at Chevron’s Step
One, rendering the SEC’s interpretation of the proviso as irrelevant.
See
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 73–76 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
265. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (“This [Howey] test, in shorthand form, embodies the
essential attributes that run through all of the Court’s decisions defining a security.”).
266. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64; see also Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 691
(1985) (“[W]e would note that the Howey economic reality test was designed to determine
whether a particular instrument is an ‘investment contract,’ not whether it fits within any of the
examples listed in the statutory definition of ‘security.’”).
267. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64.
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so-called “family resemblance test.” 268 The Court rejected the SEC’s
suggestion that no one test should be adopted because the disputed instrument
satisfied the various tests under discussion.269 Instead of following the SEC’s
guidance,270 the Court unnecessarily addressed the issue before it was ripe.
Additional percolation of the various tests in the lower courts would have been
advantageous.271
The Court’s handling of the matter worsened. Finding that the anointed
test provided inadequate guidance—hence the benefit of additional
percolation—the Court took it upon itself to provide that guidance.272 After
rejecting the test for “investment contracts” as applicable to “notes,” the Court
set forth criteria for determining whether an instrument is a “note” that
virtually mirror the criteria for determining whether an instrument is an
“investment contract.”

268. See id. at 64–65 (“Because we think the ‘family resemblance’ test provides a more
promising framework for analysis, . . . we adopt it.”); see also Gordon, supra note 44, at 391
(“That’s merely a conclusion. That statement is the equivalent of saying that the Court likes the
test better. Moreover, the family resemblance test is not an analytical test at all. It’s a ‘smell’
test.”).
269. See Brief for the United States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 8, Reves, 494 U.S. 56 (No. 88-1480), 1988 WL 1025770 (“[T]his case may not be an
ideal vehicle for this Court’s review, since in our view the Co-Op’s notes qualify as securities
under any of the several tests used for determining whether a note qualifies as a security.”).
Compare Brief for the United States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra at 15
(“The different approaches developed by the courts of appeals for determining whether an
instrument is a ‘note’ obviously overlap to a significant degree. We do no doubt that those
approaches would produce similar results in many cases.”), and id. at 24 n.26 (“Should the Court
be disinclined to adopt the Second Circuit’s family resemblance test, the Court should
nonetheless hold that the Co-Op’s notes qualify as securities under either the
commercial-investment approach or the risk capital test used by the other courts of appeals.”);
and id. at 16 n.15 (referencing that the issue of the appropriate test was not squarely presented in
the lower courts), with id. at 16 (“Yet even though the approaches reflect a ‘common core,’ we
believe that the Second Circuit’s family resemblance approach is . . . superior to [the other tests].
We consequently urge [its adoption].”). Although the Commission ultimately favored adoption
of the Second Circuit’s family resemblance test over the alternatives and although the Court
should defer to the Commission’s position as to which test to adopt, the Court need not have
decided the issue, and the Court need not have deferred to the Commission’s preference that the
Court decide the issue. The Commission was free to craft its own definition of “note.” Given
the facts, the Court should not have filled the void left by the Commission.
270. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 778 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring) (“[W]e know too little to risk the finality of precision . . . .”); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7–8 (1996)
(highlighting “constructive uses of silence[:] . . . democracy-forcing” and minimalism “when the
Court is dealing with an issue of high complexity”).
271. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 871–72 (“While the courts showed considerable
facility in adumbrating the criteria to be considered in distinguishing commercial from investment
notes, they were considerably less successful in theorizing how these criteria might be ordered or
weighted.”).
272. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65, 67.
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REVES273

HOWEY
1.

An investment of money

1.

2.

In a common enterprise
(under the multiple-investor
test)

2. The notes are offered and sold
to a broad segment of the
public.

3.

With an expectation of
profits

3.

The public reasonably expects
the notes to be investments.

4. Solely from the efforts of
others.

4.

[This is inherent in notes.]

5.

5.

The absence of an alternative
regulatory scheme or other
risk-reducing factor.

The absence of an
alternative regulatory
scheme.

The motives are investment, not
commercial or consumer.

Additionally, in identifying the criteria that suggest the existence of a “note,”
the Court repeatedly and confusingly cited “investment contract” precedent
instead of precedent that addressed the existence of a “note.”274
Recently, in SEC v. Edwards, the Court determined whether an instrument
constituted an “investment contract,”275 and the Court’s analysis has since
been labeled “casual.”276

273. Gordon, supra note 44, at 403.
274. See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 66–67 (citing United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 851 (1975)) (addressing the existence of an “investment contract,” not a “note”);
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687, 693 (1985) (same); Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557–59 (1982) (same); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
353 (1943) (same); see also Gordon, supra note 44, at 403–04.
275. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393–97 (2004) (holding “that an investment scheme
promising a fixed rate of return can be an ‘investment contract’ and thus a ‘security’ subject to the
federal securities laws”).
276. LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 947.
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[T]he Court could have avoided potential confusion by explaining
how the investment contract in Edwards can be distinguished from a
note. Presumably, the casualness of the analysis will invite new
applications of the . . . investment contract test to precisely the type
of cases to which Reves said such test should not apply.277
A future Court undoubtedly will have to resolve the confusion stemming
from the Reves decision, which could have been avoided altogether by
exhibiting deference to the SEC.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite its best efforts, Congress inevitably enacts ambiguous statutes. In
resolving those ambiguities, courts routinely accord deference to an
administering agency when its position is well reasoned, consistently applied,
and longstanding. Courts should similarly accord deference to such positions
advocated by the SEC, even if the ambiguity concerns the definition of
“security.” Generalized arguments against such court deference prove
unavailing, and statutory clues counsel in favor of such deference to the
Commission. Deference to the SEC regarding the definition of “security”
would enhance continuity of the law and political accountability.

277. Id. at 949.

